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ABSTRACT 
A STUDY OF FAILURES IN THE US BANKING INDUSTRY 
Joseph D. Trendowski 
Old Dominion University, 2012 
Committee: Dr. Anil Nair (Chair), Dr. Barbara Bartkus, Dr. Larry Filer, Dr. Mike 
Provance 
This dissertation studies failures in the U.S. banking industry following the 2008 
financial crisis. The dissertation offers an exhaustive review of the organizational failure 
literature, and changes in the banking industry environment over the past century. It takes 
three theoretical perspectives - institutional, industrial organization and resource-based 
view- to analyze failures in the banking industry. 
The review and analysis allows me to trace the roots of recent bank failures to 
external (institutional, competitive) and internal (resource structure, strategy, risk) 
factors, and propose several hypotheses linking such factors with failures. The 
hypotheses are tested using a data-set that included all bank failures in the US from June 
30th, 2009 to June 29th, 2010. A second data-set that includes all recent bank failures prior 
to the crisis (2000-2007) is analyzed to compare the antecedents of bank failure prior to-
and during- a financial crisis. 
The results show that both internal and external factors contributed to recent bank 
failures. This study provides evidence that neither deterministic nor voluntaristic 
perspective alone explains corporate failures. The combination of multiple theoretical 
lenses from different perspectives provides the best understanding of failures. The 
dissertation also discusses theoretical and managerial implications of the study. 
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This dissertation is dedicated to my family, especially my parents Ray and Shirley 
Trendowski, for their support of my life-long learning process. 
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A STUDY OF FAILURES IN THE US BANKING INDUSTRY 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Between 2008 and 2010 the United States endured its third highest rate of bank 
failures since the founding of the Federal Reserve in 1913. As the entire US economy is 
dependent on the banking industry , academics, policy makers, politicians and 
practitioners have been interested in identifying the causes of these failures (as evidenced 
by the large number of articles about them in the popular business press). 
This dissertation addresses the following research questions: (a) What external 
and internal factors caused banks to fail at such an alarming rate during the financial 
crisis?, and (b) How bank failures during a financial crisis differ from bank failures prior 
to it? This paper adopts multiple theoretical perspectives to address these question and 
the answers or findings contribute to institutional theory, resource-based view theory, and 
the broader firm failure literature. 
Banking Industry Background 
The US banking industry was stable in the decade leading up to the 2008 financial 
crisis. After the dot-com bubble1 burst in the early 2000s, the Federal Reserve lowered 
the federal funds interest rate to 1% as a counter measure to boost the US economy. From 
2002 to 2006, the United States housing market was enjoying continuous expansion2 
(Hilsenrath, Ng, & Paletta, 2008). It was during this period that widespread use of 
'Bubbles are temporary increases in optimism about future prices (Glaeser, Gyourko & Saiz, 2008). 
2Between 2002 and 2006, household borrowing grew at an average annual rate of 11%, far outpacing 
overall economic growth. 
2 
multiple financial innovations led to many banks relying on risky subprime mortgages to 
foster growth3. 
One such innovation was securitization and trading of mortgages. Securitization 
occurs when a non-tradable asset is standardized to become a tradable asset in the market 
(Hellwig, 2009). In the traditional model of mortgages, a bank would loan out money 
based on the deposits it held. These banks would assume the risk involved with making 
such loans. To minimize risk and increase the amount of loans, banks began to pool 
mortgages and make them standardized assets by packaging the loans it made and selling 
them as investments (Hellwig, 2009)4. 
This financial innovation allowed banks to make loans more aggressively which 
made it easier for borrowers to get credit. Easier credit and lower interest rates led to 
increased demand for housing, which led to higher prices for houses. Consumers realized 
that they could take out a large home loan and refinance it at a later date once they had 
some equity established. However, these decisions were based on speculation that the 
housing market would continue to rise. An increasing number of borrowers took out 
adjustable rate mortgages5 (Hellwig, 2009). They would pay a steady interest rate for the 
initial period and pay a different interest rate later on based on the current market rate. 
Some consumers took out interest only loans where they would only payback the interest, 
and not the principal, for the first few years of the loan. These consumers anticipated they 
3 A subprime mortgage is categorized as a mortgage offered to a person with a low credit rating: FICO 
score below 620. 
4 Mortgage-backs securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO) were two ways that banks 
did this. MBS is a type of Asset-back security (ABS). ABS value is derived from a specific pool of 
underlying assets. Small and illiquid assets are pooled together since they are unable to be sold 
individually. Pooling the assets into financial instruments allows them to be sold to investors as 
investments. CDOs are a type of structured ABS with multiple "tranches"- a group of related securities 
offered as part of the same transaction. Tranches were split into different risk classes and sold to investors. 
5 Adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) accounted for 6% of the market in 2001 and 26% of the market in 2006 
(Hellwig, 2009). 
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could refinance the loan in the later years or sell the home at a higher price (Hellwig, 
2009). The problem for borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages is that a small increase 
in interest rates will substantially increase the mortgage payment on such a large loan6. 
Individuals who could barely afford the original payment were unable to absorb, an 
increase in price when the grace period ended. 
Banks began capitalizing on the subprime market - providing loans to individuals 
with a credit score below 620- relatively conservatively. Initially, they would loan out 
subprime mortgages at a higher interest rate to compensate for the increased risk-taking. 
However, they soon realized that there was a much better payback rate than expected 
(Demyanyk & Hemert, 2008). They were earning a higher rate of return on these 
subprime mortgages and not encountering a high default rate. As a result, banks were 
rushing more subprime mortgages to the market. Lending became more aggressive, 
targeting consumers who wouldn't normally qualify for a mortgage. 
The subprime mortgage bubble7 was relatively stable until interest rates began to 
rise. High interest rates, low average FICO scores, and low house appreciation created a 
"perfect storm" (Demyanyk & Hemert, 2008). The system was based on consumer's 
ability to receive money inexpensively and purchase housing. When the interest rates 
rose, the ability of consumers to purchase a house diminished. Banks suddenly faced a 
market with fewer credible borrowers to lend to. Additionally, consumers who already 
had a mortgage and planned to refinance were unable to do so due to tighter credit 
standards. This led to a dramatic increase in the number of mortgage defaults thus 
sExample: A family took out a $300,000 (ARM) loan in June, 2003 when the average mortgage was 5.43%. 
Five years later (2008), this mortgage rate was adjusted based on the market interest rate which was 6.88%. 
Overnight, their mortgage payment escalated from $1,690 per month to $1,971 per month; a 17% increase. 
7 Exogenous irrational bubbles are temporary increases in optimism about future prices (Glaeser, Gyourko 
& Saiz, 2008). 
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creating an enormous financial burden on exposed institutions. The government bailed 
out large banks by providing capital to restart lending to avoid a greater economic 
collapse. Smaller banks, which were not seen as a vital pillar of the US economy, were 
left alone to fight for survival. 
Research on Corporate Failures 
Corporate failure has been studied in a multitude of ways. Concepts such as 
organizational decline (Whetten, 1980), organizational mortality (Carroll, 1983), 
organizational death (Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983), bankruptcy (Sutton & 
Callahan, 1987), organizational extinction (Zuniga-Vicente & Vicente-Lorente, 2006), 
and organizational exit (Ross & Staw, 1993; Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010), have been 
used to explain aspects of firm failure. 
Literature on failures can be categorized into two dichotomous streams of 
research; deterministic and voluntaristic (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004). The first stream of 
research studied external environmental factors as the primary cause of failures. The 
deterministic view is centered on the idea that the industry matters most when it comes to 
failure. Firms are seen as being embedded in their environment. These external factors 
impact and constrain the firm so significantly that management has little or no control 
over the firm's outcome, thus failure is a result of external factors (see Rumelt, 1991; 
MaGahan & Porter, 1997). 
The second stream of research looks at internal causes of firm failures. Failure is 
linked to internal inadequacies in dealing with external threats (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 
2004). The strategic choice (Child, 1972) perspective argues that managers are not 
5 
powerless and can ultimately determine whether or not the firm will fail. Managers are 
viewed as the principal decision makers of the firm (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and work 
within external environment constraints. Decision makers are considered more important 
than the external context where the decision is made. 
As Wittleoostuijn (1998) points out, one of the shortcomings of failure literature 
is that it often takes on either an internal or external approach, even though organizations 
don't mechanically react to environmental forces or exercise unrestricted free will 
(Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985). The divide created by the two dimensional approach has been 
sustained by assumptions that both the theoretical and methodological differences are too 
insurmountable (Witteloostuijn, 1998). Thus, the two schools have evolved 
independently with little synergy, creating significant research and theoretical gaps in our 
understanding of organizational failure (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004). 
This dissertation will develop an integrated model, encompassing both internal 
and external factors, to examine firm failure. The antecedents of failure will be 
empirically tested within the context of the US banking system. The US banking system 
will provide a distinctive backdrop as it is a highly regulated industry. The regulated 
industry is significant because it diminishes managerial discretion. 
Strategic Importance of Banking 
Banks are strategically important due to the impact they have on the broader 
economy; more so than failures of firms in other industries. Part of the issue is a result of 
the financial contagion (Allen & Gale, 2000) or domino effect of bank failures. Since 
banks are so intertwined financially through lending and borrowing from each other, a 
failure of any one bank is more likely to spill over to other banks. Banks are considered 
more susceptible to contagion for three reasons (Kaufman, 1996): 
1) Banks have low capital-to-assets ratios (high leverage) which provides the bank 
with little room for losses; 
2) Banks have low cash-to-assets ratios (fractional reserves) which may require the 
bank to sell off earning assets to meet deposit obligations; 
3) Banks have high demand debt and short-term debt-to-total debt ratios (high 
potential for a run) which may require hurried asset sales to pay off running 
depositors. 
Financial contagion is often more serious in banking than other industries because it: 
a) occurs faster; b)spreads more widely within the industry; c) results in a large number 
of failures; d) results in large losses to creditors (depositors); and e) spreads beyond the 
banking industry to other sectors, the macro economy, and potentially other countries 
(Kaufman, 1994). That is why banking, as an industry, is so highly regulated. Banking is 
a major public policy concern as governments realize the dangerous ramifications of a 
failing financial institution. 
Background on Banking Failures 
The United States banking system is one of the most stable and highly respected 
financial systems in the world. However, prior to 1913, the United States did not have a 
central bank. Bank runs would occur, where too many depositors would withdraw their 
funds all at once, crippling the bank. Without a central bank, other banking institutions or 
wealthy financiers would have to loan money to the bank or it would collapse. 
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As a result of early banking crises in 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893 and 1907 (Bruner & 
Carr, 2007), consumers began to lose faith in the US banking industry. The Federal 
Reserve was created in 1913 to dispel fears and return consumer confidence. Since its 
establishment, there have only been three large scale bank failures. The noteworthy 
periods of bank failures include the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Savings and Loan 
Crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s, and the current disaster. 
The Great Depression caused many depositors to panic and withdraw all of their 
funds from commercial banks. Prior to the establishment of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 1933, bank runs were common as there was no 
insurance safeguarding deposits. Consumers ran the risk of losing their entire savings if 
their bank were to fail. Under the Banking Act of 1933 (also referred to as the Glass-
Steagall Act), the FDIC guaranteed deposits of up to $2,500 per account. Within a year, 
this was raised to $5,0008. Not only did the act subdue consumer fear of losing 
everything, it also tightened regulation regarding how banks were run. 
The bank failures of the late 1920s and early 1930s are easily be grouped into 
broad geographical groupings and bank types (Stauffer, 1981). More than one-third of all 
existing banks failed in the immediate aftermath of the Great Depression (Walter, 2005). 
Part of that was attributed to the banking industry being overbuilt. In the 1930s, there 
were over 30,000 banking institutions operating in the United States. Most of the new 
small banks were formed in small towns and rural communities. Many of these banks 
were started without adequate financial or managerial resources (Walter, 2005). Once 
there was an economic shock, many ill-prepared banks suddenly failed. Most of these 
failures were attributed to falling agricultural prices (Temin, 1976) as the difficulties 
8 http://www.fdic.gov/anriiversary/about.html 
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suffered by farmers triggered the failures (Walter, 2005). By comparison, the bank 
failures of the late 2000s are largely associated with housing price decline rather than 
agricultural issues. During this crisis, failure rates were highest in areas with the largest 
decline in housing prices9 and largest increase in mortgage delinquency rates (Aubuchon 
& Wheelock, 2010). These were the same states that had the largest housing price 
increases as well as the largest increases in the number of subprime mortgages. 
From the late 1930's through the 1970's, banking markets were stable. This 
period incurred very little regulatory and technological change. However, in the 1980s, 
significant changes began to alter the market structure and increase competition. As a 
result, the number of banks has dramatically decreased as a result of failures, mergers, 
and acquisitions. 
The banking failures of the 1980s and early 1990s have been attributed to market 
forces, regional and sectoral recessions, and excessive risk taking (Hanc, 1997). Similar 
to the 1930s, geography played a significant role in determining which banks failed. For 
example, over one-third of all bank failures in the 1980s and 1990s occurred in Texas 
(Hanc, 1997). The sharp increase of bank failures in the 1980s along with the apparent 
vulnerability of banks to sudden shifts in local economic conditions led the federal 
government to relax branch banking restrictions (Aubuchon & Wheelock, 2010). 
O'Driscoll (1988) and Kane (1989) pointed to federal deposit insurance for promoting 
excessive risk taking during the 1980s. Since depositors are insured against loss, there is 
no incentive to monitor bank activities or demand risk premia on deposit interest rates 
9 Nationwide, the median house price rose 58% from 2000 to 2006. Subsequently, there was a 15% 
decrease in housing prices over the next four years (Table 1). Statistics are computed using the FHFA 
Housing Index. 
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(Wheelock & Kumbhaker, 1994). Insurance encouraged banks and S&L institutions to 
take excessive risk, leading to increased failures. 
Considerable regulatory change occurred in the 1990s. The Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branch Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA) permitted healthy bank holding 
companies to acquire banks in any state. Beginning on June 1, 1997, IBBEA allowed for 
interstate mergers between banks, thus ushering a new era of large mega-banks. 
In 1999, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) removed the restrictions imposed 
on banks by the Glass Steagall Act (1934) and the Bank Holding Company Act (1956). 
Also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act, the GLBA repealed 
longstanding prohibitions on banks, securities firms and insurance companies (Nair & 
Trendowski, 2011). Banks are now able to operate all three lines of business under one 
entity. By eliminating barriers between insurance, banking, and securities industries, the 
organization of the financial services industry underwent extreme change (Yildirim, 
Kwag, & Collins, 2006). Between 2000 and 2010, the number of banking institutions has 
dropped 30% while total deposits grew 90%. As a result, the average size of an institution 
has grown 248% during that period. Table 1 provides statistics on the last 10 years of the 
U.S. Banking Industry and Housing Market. 
TABLE 1: STATISTICS ON 10 YEAR PEF JOD OF THE US BANKEN IG INDUSTRY AND HOUSING MARKET ,u 
Year Institutions 
% 
Growth Branches 
% 
Growth Deposits (1,000s) 
% 
Growth 
Deposits/ 
Institution 
% 
Growth 
Median 
House 
Price11 
% 
Growth 
2010 7,821 -4.7 98,515 -1.1 7,675,620,512 1.5 981,412 6.3 189,830 -2.95 
2009 8,185 -3.1 99,550 0.9 7,559,615,705 7.6 923,594 11.0 195,600 -5.15 
2008 8,441 -1.9 99,164 1.9 7,025,791,283 4.8 832,341 6.9 206,230 -7.38 
2007 8,605 -1.9 97,274 2.7 6,702,052,747 3.9 778,856 5.9 222,670 0.22 
2006 8,767 -1.0 94,752 2.9 6,449,863,880 8.7 735,698 9.8 222,190 6.06 
2005 8,856 -2.4 92,043 2.5 5,933,762,988 8.6 670,027 11.1 209,490 10.38 
2004 9,066 -2.1 89,785 2.2 5,464,782,399 6.5 602,778 8.7 189,790 9.37 
2003 9,256 -2.4 87,790 1.4 5,132,110,038 11.4 554,463 14.0 173,520 7.67 
2002 9,474 -3.0 86,578 0.6 4,606,091,939 6.5 486,182 9.6 161,150 7.09 
2001 9,757 -3.7 86,069 0.7 4,326,207,001 8.1 443,395 12.0 150,480 6.96 
2000 10,119 -2.2 85,492 1.4 4,003,744,079 5.8 395,666 10.5 140,690 6.70 
10 Year 
Increase ******** -29.4 ****** 15.2 ************* 91.7 ******** 248.0 ******** 28.6 
10 Banking statistics include deposits in domestic offices (50 states and DC), Puerto Rico, and U.S. Territories. Banking statistics are as of 6/30 of stated year. 
11 Housing statistics are a four quarter average derived FHFA Housing Price Index o 
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FIGURE 1 - BANK INDUSTRY CHANGE - NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS AND 
TOTAL DEPOSITS; 2000-2010 
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As figure 1 indicates, from 2000 to 2010, the number of banking institutions steadily declined from 2000 to 
2010 while the total deposits increased from 2000 to 2010. 
FIGURE 2 - BANK INDUSTRY CHANGE -AVERAGE SIZE OF INSTITUTION; 
2000-2010 
1200 -I 
1000 -
800 • 
600 • 
400 -
200 -
0 -
llllllllll 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
• Deposits per Institution (USD millions) 
Figure 2 illustrates the consolidation of the US banking industry by showing the average size of an 
institution during this timeframe. 
Expected Theoretical Contribution 
To develop a better understanding of the current bank failures, it is necessary to 
understand how external and organizational factors interact to cause failure. In this 
dissertation, bank failure is addressed through managerial perspectives rather than 
traditional finance literature (see Beaver, 1966; Meyer and Pifer, 1970; Sinkey, 1975) 
highlighting deterministic and voluntaristic causes. The findings contribute to 
institutional theory, industrial organization economics, and resource-based view 
perspectives of firm failure literature. 
Structure of Manuscript 
This dissertation is organized in the following manner. In the second chapter, the 
existing literature on organizational failures is divided by research stream and reviewed. 
A conceptual model of the antecedents of failure is presented. Next, hypotheses are 
developed to empirically test both internal and external antecedents of firm failure within 
the US banking industry. In the third chapter, the methodology is presented, with an 
explanation of the sample, research design and operationalization of key variables. 
Subsequently, a detailed plan of data analysis follows. In the fourth chapter, the empirical 
findings of the various research models are presented. Finally, in the fifth chapter, the 
results of the analyses are discussed in depth along with limitations of the study and 
opportunities for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL MODEL 
This chapter develops an exhaustive review of the literature on firm failure. The 
literature review is divided in several sections. First, various streams of failure literature 
are discussed. Next, the theories that adopt an external perspective - industrial 
organization economics and institutional theory - are reviewed separately. Following the 
review of external theories, an internal perspective- the resource-based view - is 
examined. Subsequently, a model of the antecedents of the US Banking failure is 
presented using the aforementioned theories. Finally, this chapter concludes with research 
hypotheses. 
Firm Failure literature 
The field of management is filled with an assortment of failure literature. Though 
research on failure is abundant, there is a lack of consensus about its antecedents 
(Cameron, Sutton & Whetten, 1988; Weitzel & Johnson, 1989). A review of the literature 
suggests that there appears to be inconsistent use of the term 'failure' as well. Various 
terms such as organizational decline (Whetten, 1980), organizational mortality (Carroll, 
1983), organizational death (Freeman et al., 1983), bankruptcy (Sutton & Callahan, 
1987), organizational extinction (Zuniga-Vicente & Vicente-Lorente, 2006), and 
organizational exit (Ross & Staw, 1993; Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010), along with 
failure have all been used in previous studies. It should be noted that some of the 
aforementioned terms don't all share the same exact meaning or severity. Terms such as 
organizational decline, retrenchment, and downsizing are less severe. Even bankruptcy 
may be considered different due to variations in the types of bankruptcy. Firms that file 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States are permitted to remain in control of their 
business as a debtor in possession while firms declaring Chapter 7 bankruptcy cease 
operations and liquidate their assets12. 
Bank failure, per FDIC guidelines, has a consistent definition. A bank fails when 
"it is unable to meet its obligations to depositors and others". When a bank failure does 
occur, the FDIC acts in two capacities. First, the FDIC pays insurance to the depositors, 
up to the insurance limit, as guaranteed by the Banking Act of 1933. Since its inception, 
no depositor has ever lost a penny of insured deposits since the FDIC was created. 
Secondly, as the "receiver" of the failed bank, the FDIC assumes the task of settling debts 
in excess of the insurance limit. This is unique to management literature as most other 
failures disappear. In contrast, failed banks often continue on with another financial 
institution with assistance from the FDIC. Of the 181 bank failures occurring between 
June 30th, 2009 and June 29th, 2010, 175 (96.7%) failures had FDIC financial assistance 
to become part of another institution. The remaining 6 (3.3%) bank failures were closed 
due to financial difficulty- similar to other corporate failures. In these instances, the FDIC 
settled all debts, but no new institution was created. Larger failing banks, such as Bank 
of America, are prevented from failure from the federal government. When a bank is 
large and interconnected with other institutions, they are bailed out to prevent wide 
spread failure. In this case, bank failure differs significantly from other corporate failures 
as the largest firms essentially cannot fail. 
12 http://www.sec.gov/answers/bankrup.htm 
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This dissertation encompasses the literature primarily on organizational exit, 
death, mortality and failure as failed banks differ from merged and acquired ones. Table 2 
provides a summary of empirical articles that examine firm survival and failure. The 
empirical summary reviews nearly 30 years of failure literature beginning in the early 
1980s. 
The failure literature in the 1980s focused on external causes. It was assumed that 
organizations are embedded in their environments and, therefore, external factors have 
more explanatory power than firm level factors (McGahan & Porter, 1997; Rumelt, 
1991). Determinism reflects the power of the environment over the organization 
(Bourgeois, 1984). Determinism focuses on adaptation to environmentally constrained 
processes where management has few options and little impact on overall firm success 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977). According to Papadakis, Lioukas & Chambers (1998), 
strategic decisions and processes reflect "adaptations to opportunities, threats, constraints, 
and other characteristics of the environment". Managers are strategically unimportant as 
they are secondary to the external forces placed on the firm (Pfeffer, 1977, 1981; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978). 
By the 1990s, an increasing number of researchers began to examine internal 
reasons for firm failure. These scholars felt that previous literature was overly 
deterministic. External approaches ignore what is going on inside the firm. It fails to 
answer why firm in the same industry, facing the same industry level constraints, have 
different outcomes (Flamholtz & Aksehirli, 2000). The internal perspective provides an 
alternative pathway to survival based on the actions of individual organizations. Several 
studies demonstrated that performance is determined by strategy more so than industry 
TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON FIRM FAILURE 
Author (s) Year Data Set Findings 
Carroll & Delacroix 1982 Newspaper industry: 
19th Century Argentinean 
Press 
19th, 20th Century Irish 
Press 
Industry maturity and general economic expansion enhance survival 
but timing of birth relative to business cycles does not affect 
survival. 
Organizational mortality rates vary across a wide range of 
environmental dimensions including industry age, economic 
development and political turbulence. 
There exists a major variation in organizational death rates 
occurring in the early ages of organizational life. 
Carroll 1983 52 Data Sets: 
23 retail firms, 
20 manufacturing, 
4 craft enterprises, 
4 service enterprise, 
1 wholesale enterprise 
Finding supports liability of newness. 
Capital intensive manufacturing organizations generally showed 
lower death rates than other organizations. 
Freeman, Carroll, 
Hannan 
1983 3 populations: 
National labor unions 
Semiconductor electronic 
manufacturers 
Newspaper publishing 
companies 
Also found support for liability of newness. 
Found a size-dependent, monotonic decline in the risk of mortality. 
Larger firms are assumed to have more resources, better managerial 
skills and closer inter-organizational relationships that presumably 
enhance the organizations capacity to withstand significant 
environmental changes. 
as 
TABLE 2 CONTINUED 
Author (s) Year Data Set Findings 
Freeman & Hannan 1983 Restaurant organizations in 
18 California cities. 
Sampled 985 
establishments. 
Niche Width Theory - environmental variations affect the life 
chances of specialist and generalist organization. 
Carroll 1985 2,808 American local 
newspapers. 
Resource partitioning model showed that specialist organizations 
respond differently to concentrated markets from generalist 
organizations: as the death rates of generalist go up, those of 
specialists go down. 
Niche Width Theory - When competition in the generalist market is 
high, generalists tend to die and specialists tend to live 
Specialists tend to dominate when uncertainty is high because the 
cost of generalism is high. 
Less concentrated markets can produce symbiosis between 
generalists and specialists. 
Singh, House, & Tucker 1986 All 389 Voluntary social 
service organizations 
(VSSOs) that came into 
existence in metropolitan 
Toronto, Canada; 1970-
1980. 
Study examines impact of organizational change. 
Some changes are disruptive, some are adaptive and some have no 
impact on organizational mortality. 
Selection and adaptation are complementary; not contradictory. 
Singh, Tucker, & House 1986 All 389 Voluntary social 
service organizations 
(VSSOs) that came into 
existence in metropolitan 
Toronto, Canada; 1970-
1980. 
External legitimacy significantly reduces organizational death rates. 
Internal organizational changes are unrelated to death rate. 
TABLE 2 CONTINUED 
Author (s) Year Data Set Findings 
Dunne, Roberts, & 
Samuelson 
1988 4 digit SIC Codes: 
Manufacturing firms 
300,000- 350,000 
manufacturing firms per 
firm year; 1963-1982. 
Substantial heterogeneity in entry and exit patterns across industry. 
Market share of each entering cohort declines as the cohort ages. 
Decline is driven by high exit rates that overwhelm the increase in 
the average size of surviving cohort members. 
Hambrick & D'Aveni 1988 57 large bankruptcies. 
57 matched survivors. 
Weaknesses in failed firms show up relatively early. 
Features of the downward spiral include weaknesses in slack and 
performance, extreme and indecisive strategic actions, and abrupt 
environmental decline. 
Carroll & Hannan 1989 5,207 newspapers from 
nine populations; both 
international and domestic. 
Dates ranged from 1800 -
1975. 
Density Dependence - the number of organizations is assumed to 
be a function of the social processes of legitimization and 
competition. 
The model of density dependence asserts that founding rates and 
mortality rates are a function of the social processes of legitimation 
and competition. 
At low density, the model predicts that the legitimation process will 
dominate and will lead to high organizational founding rates and 
low organizational mortality rates. 
At high levels of density, competition will dominate, and 
consequently founding rates will decline and mortality rates will 
rise. 
00 
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Author (s) Year Data Set Findings 
D'Aveni 1989 Matched Sample 
49 Bankrupt firms 
49 Non-Bankrupt firms 
Firms were matched by 
environment and size. 
Defined organizational decline in a new way: treating decline as a 
pattern of decrease over time in a firm's internal resources 
measured by an index of internal resource munificence. 
Results indicate four findings: 
(1) Found existence of different patterns of decline. 
(2) Patterns of decline are related to time of the consequences of 
decline. (3) Consequences of decline include managerial 
imbalances, actions concerned with efficiency, centralization 
effects, and strategic paralysis. (4)Firms may delay or even avoid 
bankruptcy if their environment is sufficiently buoyant (growing) 
to support a resource deficient firm. 
Bruderl & Schussler 1990 Complete set of business 
registrations and 
deregistrations for Munich 
and Bavaria (West 
Germany) from January 1, 
1980 to March 31, 1989. 
Challenged the liability of newness argument theoretically and 
empirically with the liability of adolescence perspective. 
Liability of adolescence distinguishes between two periods of an 
organizational life cycle. 
Adolescence phase - death rates are low, following a non­
monotonic risk function. New organizations typically possess a 
stock of slack resources. The higher the initial endowment, the 
longer duration of adolescence. 
Post-adolescence phase- monitoring ends and endowments return 
to equilibrium and organizations are subject to usual risks of 
failure. 
o 
TABLE 2 CONTINUED 
Author (s) Year Data Set Findings 
Baum & Oliver 1991 Child care service 
organizations in Toronto, 
Canada between 1971 and 
1987. 
Institutional relation plays a significant role in reducing the 
likelihood of organizational mortality. 
Institutional attachments confer a variety of survival advantages on 
organizations such as increased stability, social support, 
legitimacy, access to resources, and invulnerability to questioning. 
Younger organizations benefit more from institutional linkages 
than older ones when faced with liability of newness. 
Levinthal 1991 All newspapers founded in 
Argentina from 1800-1900 
and Ireland from 1800-
1975. 
Surviving organizations will tend to be organizations successful in 
prior periods consequently buffering them from subsequent 
selection pressure. 
Baum & Mezias 1992 Manhattan Hotel Industry 
1898-1990. 
Hotels located in densely populated regions of the distributions of 
organizational size, geographic location, and price experienced 
significantly higher failure rates. 
Bruderl, Preisendorfer, 
& Ziegler 
1992 1,849 German 
entrepreneurs. 
Organizational characteristics, especially number of employees, 
amount of capital invested, and organizational strategies 
(particularly businesses aiming at a national market) are the most 
important determinants of survival. 
TABLE 2 CONTINUED 
Author (s) Year Data Set Findings 
Amburgey, Kelly, & 
Barnett 
1993 1,011 Finnish newspapers 
over 193 years. 
Organizational change can be both adaptive and disruptive. 
Overtime, the same forces that make organizations inert also make 
them more malleable. 
Organizational changes have two consequences: 
(1)Immediate increase in the hazard of organizational failure. 
(2)Immediate increase in the likelihood of additional changes of 
the same type. 
The immediate effect declines over time in both cases. 
Mitchell 1994 Seven America product 
markets established between 
1950s and 1980s. 
415 product market entries 
that involved 327 distinct 
companies. 
Explores the interrelationship of economic, ecological, and 
evolutionary explanations of firm survival. 
The influences of business sales and age differ systematically by 
the type of entrant and type of exit. 
The dissolution rate declined greater with sales and age for startup 
firms. 
Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, 
& Woo 
1997 1,547 entrepreneurs of new 
businesses in the US. 
Threshold model - explains why some firms survive while other 
firms with equal economic performance do not. Survival is 
dependent on a firm's own threshold of performance. 
The Threshold is determined by the entrepreneur's human capital 
characteristics such as alternative employment opportunities, 
psychic income, and cost of switching to other occupations. 
Findings suggest that firms with low thresholds may choose to 
continue or survive despite comparatively low performance. 
K) 
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Author (s) Year Data Set Findings 
Ranger-Moore 1997 New York life insurance 
companies; 1813-1985. 
Organizational size affects failure rates non-monotonically. Large 
size almost always lowers failure rate. 
Finds strong liability of aging in contrast to liability of newness 
and adolescence. 
Organizational inertia is especially problematic during periods of 
environmental turbulence. 
Pennings, Lee, & 
Witteloostuijn 
1998 Dutch accounting firms; 
mo-1990 
2,081 firms total. 
Human and social capital strongly predicted firm dissolution. 
Effects depended on their specificity and non-appropriability. 
Findings suggest an integration of the resource based view of the 
firm and organizational ecology. 
Henderson 1999 US personal computer 
industry; 1975-1992. 
649 firms entered 
441 firms failed 
3,022 firm years. 
Technology strategy has two important influences on aging. 
Age dependence varied across strategies. 
The joint effects of age and strategy produced long term trade-offs 
across difference performance outcomes. 
Multiple patterns of age dependence may simultaneously exist 
within a single population. 
TABLE 2 CONTINUED 
Author (s) Year Data Set Findings 
Agarwal, Sarkar, & 
Echambadi 
2002 33 product innovations that 
span most of the 20th 
century. 
Found impact of time on both survival rates and relationships 
previously thought to be universalistic. 
Haveman & Khaire 2004 US Magazine Industry; 
1741 to 1861. 
Ideology is a strong moderator of the relationship between founder 
succession and organizational failure. 
Ideology conditions the impact of managerial roles and 
organizational affiliations on failure following founder succession. 
Knott & Posen 2005 US Banking Industry; 
1984-1997. 
Failed firms generate externalities that significantly and 
substantially reduce industry cost. 
On average these benefits exceed the private costs of the entrants. 
Thus failure appears to be good for the economy. 
Kim & Miner 2007 All FDIC-insured 
commercial banks chartered 
from January 1,1984, 
through December 31, 1998 
Organizations learn from near-failures. 
Failure-related experience occurring in the same geographic 
market matters more than experience outside of the market. 
Geroski, Mata, & 
Portugal 
2010 All 118,070 Portuguese new 
firm startups from 1983-
1993. 
Economics, organizational ecology and the resourced-based view 
of the firm have all been used to examine firm survival. 
There is no absolute superiority of any of the aforementioned 
theoretical perspectives over the others, and there are important 
elements in all of them to explain the survival of firms. 
Trendowski 2011 181 Bank failures; 2009-
2010. 
Bank failures are associated with different internal and external 
antecedents during a financial crisis. 
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(Brush, Bromiley, & Hendricks, 1999; Flamholtz & Aksehirli, 2000; Mauri & Michaels, 
1998) conflicting with earlier studies done by McGahan & Porter (1997) and Rumelt 
(1991). 
Recently, research has incorporated multiple internal and external perspectives to 
get a more complete picture of firm failure (see Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010). This 
dissertation aims to extend failure research by using multiple theories and viewing failure 
from internal and external perspectives. 
Failure Debate: Internal or External Causes 
One of the prominent debates in firm failure literature is whether external (Baum 
& Mezias, 1992; Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986) or firm level factors (Brush et al. 1999; 
Mauri & Michaels 1998) have more explanatory power. The deterministic viewpoint 
argues that when it comes to failure, industry matters more than the firm. It postulates 
that failure is caused by external factors that management has little or no control over. 
The external viewpoint coincides with the industrial organization (IO) economics (Porter, 
1980), institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), systems theory (Anderson, 1999) 
and population ecology13 (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) literature. 
The IO perspective includes three underlying assumptions (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 
2004). First, the IO perspective assumes that the external environment imposes pressures 
and constraints on firm strategies which would lead to failure. Secondly, firms operating 
in the industry, or niche within, are assumed to pursue the same strategy. Finally, since 
organizational decision makers are assumed rational and committed to the firm's best 
interest, failure cannot be caused by them alone. 
13 This dissertation does not use the population ecology or systems theory perspectives. 
Institutional theory posits that an organization's survival prospects increase as it 
gains legitimacy, social support, and approbation from external constituents of its 
institutional environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & 
Scott, 1983; DiMaggio, 1988; Powell, 1988; Scott, 1995). The basis for institutional 
theory is that organizations take actions that make them more similar (to achieve 
legitimacy) and not necessarily more efficient (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Within 
institutional theory, legitimacy is a stronger determinant of survival than efficiency. 
Within systems theory, industries evolve in a dynamic, path dependent manner 
over time as a result of complex interactions (Levy, 1999). The structure of the industry 
influences firm behavior, while the firm behavior has the ability to alter the structure of 
the industry and the contours of competition (Levy, 1999). Adaptive entities contain an 
adaptive inner environment (Simon, 1996). Complex adaptive systems evolve when new 
agents or new schemata are introduced (Anderson, 1999). They consist of a large number 
of dynamically (usually non-linear) interacting elements (McKelvey, 2004), where 
decisions by one actor take into account potential reactions by others, thereby reflecting 
interdependence among firms. Failure or success, within systems theory, is the outcome 
of complex interactions between an organization and its changing environment (Levy, 
1999). Highly ordered systems are too rigid (versus adaptive systems) to successfully 
coordinate new behaviors and therefore will likely fail (Schneider & Somers, 2006). 
Population ecology postulates that organizational survival is the result of 
environmental pressures that differently select adaptive forms for retention in an 
organizational population (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Among the various environmental 
selection criteria facing organizations, population ecologists have elaborated specifically 
on external pressures for legitimacy and the forces of competition and institutionalization 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984). 
The primary weakness of the external viewpoints lies in what is ignored. By 
placing all the focus on external factors, little attention has been paid to internal firm 
factors. Since most industries have an array of successful and non-successful firms, the 
IO perspective, by itself, seems overly deterministic. It fails to provide an alternative 
pathway to survival based on the actions of individual organizations. The perspective 
omits the possibility that an organization, through rational action, has the ability to 
achieve survival. 
The internal approach assumes managers control their destiny. Managers are 
viewed as the principal decision makers of the firm (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and their 
perception of the external environment has a strong effect on how they manage or 
mismanage the firm (Mone et al. 1998). The strategic choice (Child, 1972) is emphasized 
over the external context of the decision. Failure is linked to internal inadequacies dealing 
with external threats. Internal causes of failure may arise from (a) impulsive decisions 
that overextend the organizations assets, (b) not responding to change, (c) an executive 
who is either too powerful or poorly informed, and (d) unnecessary risk taking (Mellahi 
& Wilkinson, 2004). I expand on these external and internal causes of firm failure in 
greater detail after a brief discussion of the changes in the banking industry environment. 
Banking Industry Environment Changes 
Two major regulatory changes in the 1990s have drastically altered the banking 
industry's competitive environment. In the past, regulations limiting intrastate banking 
protected small and inefficient banks from external competition (Kroszner & Strahan, 
1999). The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branch Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994, 
afforded banks greater ability to operate across state lines. Prior to IBBEA, bank 
operations were limited geographically. Neighborhood banks were able to evolve 
independently without concern from outside competition. However, once this act was 
established, additional competition could come from similar sized banks across state lines 
or large national banks from anywhere in the US. 
Opponents of deregulation argued that it would lead to a highly concentrated 
banking market, where consumers would suffer at the expense of higher bank profits 
(Dick, 2008). Banks that were opposed to deregulation and the subsequent branch 
banking were the same institutions that were most likely to suffer from it (Kroszner & 
Strahan, 1999). Without the protection of geographic barriers, small community banks 
would now face an open market of competition. Upon the removal of geographic limiting 
barriers, small-inefficient banks immediately lost market share (Yildirim & Mohanty, 
2010) as large firms become large because they are efficient (Demsetz, 1973). 
Subsequently, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which permitted banks to 
operate in multiple lines of business, provided additional advantages to larger banks. 
National banks through their vast resource networks and economies of scale are able to 
offer features that customers may find useful such as product diversification or service 
expertise. The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act (GLBA) repealed the separation of investment 
banking and commercial banking from the Glass-Steagall Act of 193314. GLBA provided 
14 The Glass-Steagall Act, also known as the Banking Act of 1933, was designed to control speculation. It 
protected bank depositors from additional risks associated with security transactions by prohibiting 
depository institutions from engaging in investment business. Additionally, the GSA created the Federal 
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financial holding companies the ability to engage in underwriting and selling insurance 
and securities; commercial and merchant banking; investing in and developing real 
estate; and other complimentary activities. GLBA also permitted bank holding companies 
to own other financial institutions. Previously, the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) 
of 195615 prohibited such activity. Table 3 provides major regulatory changes in the US 
banking industry during the 1990s. 
Institutional Theory 
According to DiMaggio & Powell (1983) institutional forces make organizations 
more similar rather than more heterogeneous. Isomorphism with the institutional 
environment serves to enhance the legitimacy of organizations, which results in higher 
rates of organizational survival (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Institutionalization is the 
process by which actions are repeated and given a similar meaning by an individual and 
by others (Scott, 1995). DiMaggio & Powell (1983) declared mimetic isomorphism -
referring to organizations who model themselves after organizations perceived to be more 
legitimate in response to uncertainty - as one of the mechanisms through which 
isomorphic change occurs. 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to further protect depositors by insuring their deposits; Up to $5,000 
in 1934 and up to $250,000 today. To date, no depositor has lost any FDIC insured funds. 
15 Originally, BHCA required the Federal Reserve Board of Governors approval to form a bank holding 
company. It was designed to regulate and control banks that formed holding companies to own both 
banking and non-banking business. Bank holding companies were prohibited from acquiring banks in other 
states. 
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TABLE 3: RECENT REGULATORY CHANGES IN THE US BANKING 
INDUSTRY 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 
• Permits adequately capitalized and managed bank holding companies to acquire banks in any state 
one year after enactment. 
• Concentration limits apply and CRA evaluations by the Federal Reserve are required before 
acquisitions are approved. 
• Beginning June 1, 1997, allows interstate mergers between adequately capitalized and managed 
banks, subject to concentration limits, state laws and CRA evaluations. 
• Extends the statute of limitations to permit the FDIC and RTC to revive lawsuits that had expired 
under state statutes of limitations. 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
• Repeals Glass Steagall' Act of 1933. 
• Modifies Bank Holding Company Act to allow affiliations between banks and insurance 
underwriters. 
• Prohibits state actions that may prevent bank-affiliated firms from selling insurance on an equal 
basis with other insurance companies. 
• Law creates new financial holding company authorized to engage in: underwriting and selling 
insurance and securities, conduction both commercial and merchant banking, investing in and 
developing real estate and other "complementary activities" 
• Amends the Community Reinvestment Act to require that financial holding companies cannot be 
formed before their insured depository institutions receive and maintain a satisfactory CRA rating. 
• Requires public disclosure of regulatory relief to small institutions in the shape of reducing the 
frequency of their CRA examinations if they have outstanding or satisfactory ratings. 
• Prohibits affiliations and acquisitions between commercial firms and unitary thrift institutions. 
• Significant changes to the Federal Home Loan Banking System. Eases membership requirements 
and loosens restrictions on the use of FHLB funds. 
•Regulatory changes are listed in the FDIC database. 
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Finally, survival under institutional theory depends on the acquisition of cognitive 
and socio-political legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Cognitive legitimacy is defined 
as the degree to which an organization's activities are taken for granted (Shane & Foo, 
1999). Socio-political legitimacy is the "extent to which a new firm conforms to 
recognized principles or accepted rules and standards" (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Survival is 
enhanced through legitimacy by making it easier for new firms to attain access to 
resources (Aldrich & Auster, 1986), draw customers (Wiewel & Hunter, 1985), answer 
challenges about competence (Shane & Foo, 1994), face competitive threats (Baum & 
Oliver, 1991), and appear to be reliable (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). In addition to 
cognitive legitimacy, Scott (1995) discusses normative and regulative legitimacy as 
pillars of institutions that provide stability and meaning to social behavior. The 
normative pillar is socially enforced, and includes values and norms that are internalized 
by society. The regulative pillar is politically enforced. It reflects coercion, monitoring, 
enforcement and conformity to rules. Thus, institutional logic suggests that deregulation 
created uncertainty that led to enhanced imitation behavior. Moreover, firms that 
complied with new regulations and new norms of behavior achieved legitimacy whereas 
firms that did not do so failed to attain legitimacy. Table 4 shows institutional theory 
development. 
TABLE 4: INSTITUTIONAL THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Author (s) Year Journal Key Points 
Meyer & Rowan 1977 American Journal 
of Sociology 
Institutional rules function as rationalized myths that organizations 
incorporate to gain legitimacy, maintain stability, acquire resources, and 
enhance their survival prospects. 
Firms decouple their formal structures from their actual activities, because 
myths may be inconsistent with requirements for efficiency. 
Power plays an important role by influencing institutional norms; powerful 
organizations were seen as being able to construct their organizational 
goals, values, and procedures directly into society as institutional norms, 
rules, and practices. 
Isomorphism is explained is two ways: (1) boundary-spanning linkages 
between organizations and the environment were the result of technology 
exchange relationships and forced diffusion of institutional norms, 
practices, myths, etc. and (2) organizations structurally reflect socially 
constructed reality. 
DiMaggio & Powell 1983 American 
Sociological 
Review 
Institutional forces make organizations more similar rather than more 
heterogeneous. Power is reflected by an organization's ability to 'define' or 
'influence' rationalized social myths. 
Organizational changes occur because of processes that make organizations 
more similar, but not necessarily more efficient. ' 
Three mechanisms through which isomorphic change occurs: 
(1) coercive isomorphism (resulting from formal and informal pressures 
exerted on organization by other organizations with whom they are 
dependent); 
(2) mimetic isomorphism (refers to organizations who model themselves 
after organizations perceived to be more legitimate in response to 
uncertainty); 
(3) normative isomorphism (stems from two forms of professional ization, 
formal education and professional networks). 
TABLE 4 CONTINUED 
Author (s) Year Journal Key Points 
Covaleski & Dirsmith 1988 Administrative 
Science Quarterly 
Institutions are designed to preserve power and permit self-interest seeking. 
Behind every institution lies the threat of coercion (not conforming can 
bring it out). 
DiMaggio 1988 Institutional 
patterns and 
organizations: 
Culture and 
environment 
(Book chapter) 
Institutions are a political process and the relative power of actors 
determines them. 
New institutions tend to arise in response to an actor's motives to achieve 
some self-interested goal. 
The success of a given institution often legitimizes not only the institution 
itself, but also its members. 
North 1990 Institutions, 
Institutional 
Change and 
Economic 
Performance 
(Book) 
Defines institutions as the rules of the game in a society - "the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction". 
Institutions are the rules of the game and organizations are the players. 
DiMaggio & Powell 1991 The New 
Institutionalism in 
Organizational 
Analysis (Book) 
Institutions can create economic benefit through social processes that 
benefit the involved actors both directly and indirectly. 
The success of the collective action of the institution often depends on the 
creation of accepted rules. Actors "discover their preferences". 
Haveman 1993 Administrative 
Science Quarterly 
Organizations will imitate the behavior of successful organization. Firms 
within an industry tend to imitate large and profitable organizations. Large 
organizations serve as "role models" for other large organizations. 
TABLE 4 CONTINUED 
Author (s) Year Journal Key Points 
Scott 1995 Institutions and 
Organizations 
(Book) 
Institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative "pillars" that 
provide stability and meaning to social behavior. 
The cognitive pillar is constitutive, i.e. is culturally supported and 
conceptually correct. It includes symbols, codes, rules that are constitutive 
of the nature of reality, experiences, etc. 
The normative pillar is socially enforced, and it includes values and norms 
that are internalized by society. It follows a normative mechanism to 
isomorphism. 
The regulative pillar is politically enforced. It reflects coercion, 
monitoring, enforcement and conformity to rules. It offers a social realists' 
view that individuals respond to, rather than enact, the environment. It 
follows a coercive mechanism of isomorphism. 
Tolbert & Zucker 1996 Handbook of 
Organizational 
Studies 
Institutions originate through a three stage process: 
(1) Habitualization: organizational actors develop new structural 
arrangements in response to a specific organizational problem or set of 
problems. 
(2) Objectification: the formation of some degree of social consensus in the 
organization about the value of the given process or structure and the 
adoption by organizational members or other organizations based on that 
consensus. 
(3) Sedimentation: the spread of the given processes or structures across 
the full range of relevant actors and by the maintenance of these processes 
and structures over time. 
TABLE 4 CONTINUED 
Author (s) Year Journal Key Points 
Haunshild & Miner 1997 Administrative 
Science Quarterly 
Imitation is more common under conditions of uncertainty. 
Presented three models of inter-organizational imitation: 
(1) Frequency imitation - copying of common practices 
(2) Trait imitation - copying features used by certain firms 
(3) Outcome imitation - based on the impact of others 
Found support for frequency and trait-based imitation. Outcome imitation 
was only supported for very high or very low saliency. 
Staw & Epstein 2000 Administrative 
Science Quarterly 
Conforming to institutionalized rules can improve legitimacy and 
admiration for a corporation and its managers. 
Companies that followed institutionalized rules were more admired, were 
perceived to be more innovative and rated to have higher quality 
management. However, these firms did not achieve higher performance. 
Campbell 2007 Academy of 
Management 
Review 
Institutional conditions mediate relationship between economic conditions 
and corporate behavior. These include: public and private regulation, the 
presence of nongovernmental other independent organizations that 
monitor corporate behavior, institutionalized norms regarding appropriate 
corporate behavior, associative behavior among corporations themselves, 
and organized dialogues among corporations and their stakeholders. 
35 
Industrial Organization Economics 
10 economics argues that firm performance is primarily a function of the industry 
environment in which it competes. Since structure determines conduct, which in turn 
determines performance, conduct can be ignored and performance can therefore be 
explained by structure (Bain, 1968). Mobility barriers and market positions are viewed as 
the critical sources of competitive advantages for superior performance. 
Early 10 economics was concerned with the economy-wide performance of a 
complex of businesses (Bain, 1956, 1968). Bain took an external approach and used the 
industry, or competing group of firms, as the unit of analysis. By the early 1970s research 
on strategic groups - groups of firms within the same industry that follow similar 
strategies (Hunt, 1972; Newman, 1978) began to emerge. Strategic group membership is 
important to firms as it is highly associated with firm performance (Nair & Kotha, 2001). 
Porter (1980; 1985) made the most prominent contribution to the field of strategic 
management employing IO economics logic. His structural analysis of industries (Porter, 
1980) focuses on competition beyond a firm's immediate and existing rivals. Porter's 
(1980) Five Forces Model clearly specifies the various aspects of an industry structure, 
providing a useful analytic tool to assess an industry's attractiveness and facilitating 
competitor analysis. The ability for a firm to gain competitive advantage rests mainly on 
how well it positions and differentiates itself in an industry. Table 5 shows industrial 
organization economics theory development. 
TABLE 5: IO ECONOMICS THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Author (s) Year Journal Key Points 
Schumpeter 1942 Capitalism, 
Socialism, and 
Democracy 
Linked wealth creation directly to the process of opportunity discovery and 
strategy formulation. 
New firms and new resource combinations within established firms are 
introduced into an economic system. 
Bain 1968 Industrial 
Organization 
Firm's performance is primarily a function of the industry environment in 
which it competes, and because structure determines conduct, which in turn 
determines performance, conduct can be ignored and performance can 
therefore, be explained by structure. 
Demsetz 1973 Journal of Law and 
Economics 
Monopoly power can be efficient; yielding firm-level advantages 
particularly where large technological investments are necessary. 
Challenged the traditional economic view that collusion and monopolies 
lead to inefficiencies. Challenged some basic beliefs about size, structure, 
efficiency and competition. 
If increased concentration has come about because of the superior 
efficiency of those firms that have become large, then an anti-merger 
policy, while it may reduce the ease of colluding, it may also lead to 
inefficiencies either through penalizing innovative success or by the shift in 
output to smaller, higher cost firms that it brings about. 
Larger firms become larger because they are more efficient. 
U> 
0\ 
TABLE 5 CONTINUED 
Author (s) Year Journal Key Points 
Porter 1980 Competitive 
Strategy 
Focused on competition beyond a firm's immediate and existing rivals; the Five 
Forces Model. 
The ability for a firm to gain competitive advantage rests mainly on how well it 
positions and differentiates itself in an industry. 
Schmalensee 1985 American 
Economic Review 
Found industry effects accounted for about 20% of the variance in business-unit 
returns (and almost 100% of the total variance explained); 
Corporate effects did not account for any variance (leaving 80% of total 
unexplained variance). 
Scherer and Ross 1990 Industrial Market 
Structure and 
Economic 
Performance 
Industry concentration leads to collusion and subsequently to greater profits. 
Lack of competition brought on by collusive activity will mean higher than normal 
prices and thus profits. 
TABLE 5 CONTINUED 
Author (s) Year Journal Key Points 
Porter 1991 Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
Outlines framework for dynamic theory of strategy, which separates the 
theoretical framework into the sources of superior performance (the cross-
sectional problem) and the dynamic process by which competitive 
positions are established over time (the longitudinal problem). 
Argues that firms sustain competitive advantage because of their capacity 
to develop and pursue strategies and actions that continuously adapt, 
innovate, and upgrade their competitive position over time. 
Exploitation of distinctive competences - firm strategy concerned with 
creation and exploitation of competences. 
Hoskisson and Hitt 1990 Journal of 
Management 
With perfect competition, no strategy will allow firms to gain an advantage 
over rivals. 
Rumelt 1991 Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
Inter-firm heterogeneity within industries explains firm performance much 
more than industry membership. 
McGahan and Porter 1997 Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
Industry represents an important factor in affecting firm performance. 
Industry effects are more important in accounting for firm performance in 
service industry than manufacturing industry. 
Dean, Brown, & 
Bam ford 
1998 Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
Industry environment has differential effects on large and small firms. 
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Resource-Based View 
The resource-based view attempts to explain heterogeneity between firms on the 
basis of resources. The theory holds that variance in competitive outcomes stems from 
differences in the characteristics in rivals' resources (Barney, 1991) and capabilities 
(Miller, 2003). Survival is dependent upon the application of this heterogeneous bundle 
of resources. In the resource-based view, the firm's resources (Barney, 1991) and method 
of deploying them (Penrose, 1959) are the basis for sustained competitive advantage. 
Therefore, firm survival is largely determined by the "extent to which firms develop firm-
specific assets that cannot be imitated by competitors and that provide the basis for their 
competitive advantage" (Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010). 
The resource-based approach focuses on the costly-to-copy attributes of the firm 
as a source of competitive advantage and performance. Initial resource-based view 
literature was economic in nature. Penrose (1959) viewed organizations as: (a) an 
administrative framework that links and coordinates activities of numerous individuals 
and groups; and (b) a bundle of productive resources. Therefore firm growth, in RBV, is 
limited "by the productive opportunities that exist as a function of the bundle of 
productive resources controlled by a firm and by the administrative framework used to 
coordinate the use of these resources". In contrast to deterministic viewpoints, Penrose 
(1959) elaborated that firms can be fundamentally heterogeneous even if they are in the 
same industry. 
Heterogeneity (Barney, 1986) is a function of the manner in which firms acquire 
and accumulate resources from imperfectly competitive strategic factor markets in order 
to pursue the strategies of the firm. Amit and Shoemaker (1993) attribute heterogeneity to 
managerial decisions that are characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and conflict. 
They argue that firm heterogeneity occurs due to the realization of sustainable rents as a 
function of: (a) resource and market imperfections, and (b) the discretionary decisions 
made by managers about resource development, and deployment that lead to differences 
in the resources and capabilities that the firm controls. Amit and Shoemaker (1993) 
conclude that economic rents persist from imperfect and discretionary decisions to 
develop and deploy selected resources that are made by boundedly rational managers 
facing high uncertainty, complexity, and intra-firm conflict. Due to uncertainty, 
complexity, and conflict, firms will employ different strategic assets. 
Firm survival within RBV, is largely determined by the extent to which firms 
develop firm specific assets that cannot be imitated by competitors, and thus provide 
basis for their competitive advantage (Geroski, et al., 2010). These resources can be 
anything that is considered a strength or weakness of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Table 6 shows resource-based view theory development. 
TABLE 6: RESOURCE BASED VIEW THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Author (s) Year Journal Key Points 
Penrose 1959 Book; Oxford 
University Press 
Observed that the bundles of productive resources varied between firms 
Firm growth and competitive advantage could be understood (a) as an 
administrative framework that links and coordinates the activities of the 
firm and (b) by the productive opportunities that exist as a function of the 
bundle of productive resources. 
Resources are heterogeneous between firms; that is, competing firms 
possess different bundles of resources. 
Wernerfelt 1984 Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
Resource is defined as anything that can be thought of as a strength or 
weakness of the firm; specifically, tangible and intangible assets which are 
tied semi-permanently to the firm. 
Strategy must balance the development of new resource with the 
exploitation of current resources. 
Rumelt 1984 Book Chapter; in 
Competitive 
Strategic 
Management 
(Lamb, R.B. 1984) 
Defined firms as a bundle of productive resources and suggested that firm 
heterogeneity and thus the economic value of these resources will vary, 
depending on the context within which they are applied. 
Firms are heterogeneous due to their specific resources, and that firms 
make different choices based upon their resources. 
Barney 1986 Management 
Science 
Firm heterogeneity is a function of the manner in which firms acquire and 
accumulate resources from strategic factor markets (SFMs) which are 
imperfectly competitive, in order to pursue the strategies of the firm 
Dierickx & Cool 1989 Management 
Science 
Asset stocks are strategic to the extent that they are non-tradable, 
inimitable, and non-substitutable; critical resources are accumulated rather 
than acquired in strategic factor markets and that the sustainability of a 
firm's asset position is a function of the ease with which assets can be 
substituted or imitated. 
TABLE 6 CONTINUED 
Author (s) Year Journal Key Points 
Barney 1991 Journal of 
Management 
Firm heterogeneity and thus sustained competitive advantage is a function 
of firm resources that have the following attributes: 
Valuable: resource must have value; 
Rareness: refers to the physical or perceived physical rareness of the 
resources in the factor markets; 
Inimitability: which is the continuation of imperfect factor markets via 
information asymmetry such that resources cannot be obtained or recreated 
by other firms without a cost disadvantage; and 
Non-substitutability: when no strategically equivalent alternatives exist; 
that is, where two (or more) valuable firm resources should not be 
equivalent when each can be exploited separately to implement the same 
strategies. 
Castanias & Helfat 1991 Journal of 
Management 
RBV addresses the incentives problems within agency theory. 
The creation and appropriation of rents help align the interests of a firm's 
owners and managers. Managers are believed to have inherent incentives to 
perform well. 
Amit & Schoemaker 1993 Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
Heterogeneity between firms is attributed to managerial decisions that are 
characterized by uncertainty, complexity and conflict, such that different 
firms will employ different strategic assets. 
By definition firms must be doing something specialized or unique to 
develop a competitive advantage. 
TABLE 6 CONTINUED 
Author (s) Year Journal Key Points 
Black & Boal 1994 Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
Firm heterogeneity and sustainable competitive advantage is a function of 
the way in which firms construct a network of relationships between 
resources, i.e., the dynamic bundling of resources. 
Resources are made up of factor networks. Inter-factor (internal network) 
and inter-resource (external network) relationships are the basis of 
sustained competitive advantage. 
Miller & Shamsie 1996 Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
The value of the firms resources are a function of the type of resources 
(property-based or knowledge-based) that the firm possesses and the level 
of environmental dynamism in the environment. 
Makadok 2003 Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
Integrates agency theory and behavior decisions theory with RBV. 
Argues that sustainable competitive advantage is a function of (1) the 
accuracy of the manager's expectations about the future value of the firm's 
resources and (2) the severity of agency problems that cause managers' 
interests to diverge from that of its shareholders. 
Denrell, Fang, & Winter 2003 Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
The sustainability of economic rents over time are potentially a function of 
(1) imperfect markets and (2) the degree to which the firm's search 
routines are enabled (or constrained) by its existing stock of resources such 
that the firm is able to identify opportunities that are not otherwise visible 
to its competitors. 
Newbert 2007 Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
RBV support varies considerably with the independent variable and 
theoretical approach employed. 
Extensions of the traditional RBV may be more useful when examining 
organizational context as opposed to static resources. 
Model of Firm Failure 
Based on prior literature and research questions, a model of the antecedents of the 
failure is proposed in Figure 3. 
FIGURE 3: RESEARCH MODEL. 
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Hypotheses Development 
This study examines the antecedents of firm failure. Hypotheses are developed to 
test both the internal and external factors contributing to firm failure. First, examining 
external factors, this study looks at how variations in institutional and macroeconomic 
factors may impact a firm's chance of survival. Using institutional theory and industrial 
organization economics frameworks, hypotheses are developed and tested. Next, the 
focus turns internally towards the firm's operations. Using the resource-based view of the 
firm, hypotheses are developed and tested to determine how the application of resources 
determines firm failure. 
External antecedents 
Institutional theory perspective 
Within institutional theory, legitimacy is defined as the acceptance of an organization 
by its external environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer 
& Scott, 1983), and is the primary driver of organizational survival (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). Legitimacy is a social judgment that is ultimately rendered to the organization by 
its constituents. Organizations are more likely to survive by obtaining legitimacy from 
external constituents of the institutional environment (Baum & Oliver, 1991). 
However, only certain actors have the standing within the environment to confer 
legitimacy (Meyer & Scott, 1983; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Baum & Oliver, 1991). 
Government regulators, who have authority over the organization (Baum & Oliver, 1991; 
Galaskiewicz, 1985; Meyer & Scott, 1983), are one source of legitimacy. Government 
deregulation of branch banking permitted banks to become larger. Larger banks typically 
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enjoy an implicit government guarantee that stems from their systemic importance (Boyd 
& Runkle, 1993). They also have a greater potential to impact the entire banking system, 
and thus are protected. 
In this recent bank failure, larger banks were assisted because of their perceived 
importance to the banking community. If they were to fail, there would be a greater 
likelihood of bank runs as the system itself would lose legitimacy. As a result, AIG, Bank 
of America, Citigroup, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, GMAC and other large firms received 
special government assistance in the form of loans, guarantees, or capital injections to 
avoid failure (Aubuchon & Wheelock, 2010). Legitimacy provided by both the 
government and public opinion helped insulate large banks from failure during this 
banking crisis. 
HI: Larger bank size will be associated with lower failure rates. 
In additional to organizational size, organizational age strongly determines 
legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996). As organizations grow older, they are more likely to 
develop stronger exchange relationships with other organizations, become a part of the 
power hierarchy, and come to have their actions endorsed by powerful collective actors 
(Stinchcombe, 1968). Thus older organizations are likely to be viewed as more legitimate 
as they will enjoy increased access to public and official resources thus improving their 
survival chances (Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986). Institutional attachments confer a 
variety of survival advantages on organizations such as increased stability, social support, 
legitimacy, access to resources, and invulnerability to questioning (Baum & Oliver, 
1991). In most instances, nothing legitimates more than longevity (Deephouse, 1996). 
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H2: Organizational age will be negatively associated with failure rates. 
Regulatory changes and technology improvements altered the competitive 
landscape of banking. The banking industry experienced significant change after the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 eliminated barriers between insurance, banking, and 
securities industries, thus creating a completely new financial services industry (Yildirim, 
Kwag, & Collins, 2006). Concurrently, the internet was becoming a powerful tool for 
banking services. Internet banking provided cost savings to banks from having fewer 
staff and physical branches as well as scale effects in bank operations (Shi, Shambare, & 
Wang, 2008). Internet banking also benefits the customer by providing cost and time 
savings, reduced dependency on location, quicker responses to complaints and improved 
services quality (Shi, Shambare, & Wang, 2008). Older, more established banks, with a 
large number of physical branches face liability of aging (see Ranger-Moore, 1997). The 
combined influences of imprinting, inertia, and environmental change render the core 
technologies of old organizations obsolete (Sorensen & Stuart, 2000). Therefore banks 
launched after 1999 will have a survival advantage over banks launched pre-deregulation. 
H2b: Banks founded after the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act will have lower failure rates 
than banks founded prior to 1999. 
IO perspective 
Several environmental factors contribute to determining the firm's expected level 
of performance, including the number of firms present and their size (Porter (1987). 
Concentration in the banking industry is limited as antitrust enforcement prevents 
mergers of non-failed banks that would significantly increase the concentration of local 
banking markets (Wheelock, 2011). Concentration in the banking industry is driven by 
entry and exit, which is dependent on failures (Perotti & Suarez, 2002). Still, there has 
been little change of local banking market concentration, and the number of dominant 
banks in them, over the last decade (Wheelock, 2011). 
Industry concentration, within industrial organization economics, typically 
decreases failure rates. Scherer and Ross (1990) proposed that industry concentration 
leads to tacit collusion and subsequently to greater profits. In essence, lack of competition 
brought on by collusive activity will mean higher than normal prices and hence higher 
profits. 
However, the uniqueness of the banking industry is evident by the disagreement 
among scholars of industry concentration's impact. Some theoretical arguments suggest 
a less concentrated banking sector is more prone to financial crisis (Allen & Gale, 2000). 
Advantages of a highly concentrated banking market are two-fold. First, concentrated 
banking systems may enhance market power and boost profits (Porter, 1979). As high 
profits provide a "buffer" against adverse shocks and increase the charter or franchise 
value of the bank, thereby diminishing incentives for bank owners and managers to take 
excessive risk, they reduce banking sector fragility. Second, it is easier to monitor 
relatively few banks compared to many banks in a segmented system. Consequently, 
bank supervision will be more effective and bank fragility will be less pronounced in a 
highly concentrated banking system. 
Other authors argue that a highly concentrated banking structure increases 
banking fragility. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) argue that although market power is 
increased in a highly concentrated banking market, the firm's behavior is often ignored 
when analyzing these markets. Bank decision making can often change when given the 
increased market power. Due to the higher interest rates that banks can charge due to the 
increased market power, banks are induced to assume greater risk. Bowman (1980, 1982) 
found there was a negative relationship between risk and return such that poor 
performance increases risk-taking which further reduces performance (Bowman, 1982; 
Bromiley, 1991). Lower concentration, therefore, minimizes bank risk and consequently 
bank fragility. 
Moreover, the impact of concentration also varies across the geographic location 
of banks. In banking, it is problematic to compare rural and urban banking markets as 
rural markets are generally more concentrated (Wheelock, 2011). By their very nature, 
farming communities are likely to have few options for banking services, and thus higher 
industry concentration. In contrast, major urban centers, with a large pool of potential 
customers, have more competitors, and generally lower concentration. High industry 
concentration in these urban markets indicates a few dominant players that control a 
majority of the market. It is in these urban markets that smaller firms are more likely to 
suffer from concentration effects and face a great chance of failure. 
H3: Higher local industry concentration will increase failure rates in urban 
markets. 
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While local banking market concentration's impact on bank failure has been 
disputed, local market volatility has not. Bank outcomes are strongly influenced by the 
robustness of their local economy (Kim & Miner, 2007). In several respects, the 
geographic patterns of recent U.S. bank failures has been similar to those episodes in the 
past as seen in both the 1930s bank crisis (Temin, 1976) and the 1980s/1990s bank crisis 
(Hanc, 1997). Even though most branching restrictions were removed more than a decade 
ago, the regional patterns of bank failures indicate that many banks remain vulnerable to 
local economic shocks (Aubuchon & Wheelock, 2010). 
Banks limited to one geographical market will severely tie themselves to its fate. 
In the early years of the financial crisis, failure rates were higher in states with the largest 
declines in personal income and gross state product as well as the largest increases in 
unemployment rates. States experiencing the largest declines in housing price and highest 
rates of mortgage delinquency were facing the greatest number of bank failures. These 
were also the same states that had the largest number of subprime mortgage and greatest 
increase in housing prices prior to the crisis. Therefore, bank failures during this 
economic crisis are expected to mirror the local economic conditions. 
H4: Greater environmental volatility will be associated with higher bank failure 
rates in a region. 
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Internal Antecedents 
The resource-based view (RBV) attempts to explain heterogeneity (performance 
differences) between firms on the basis of resources (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Barney, 1991). Economic rents persist from imperfect and discretionary decisions to 
develop and deploy selected resources that are made by boundedly rational managers 
facing high uncertainty, complexity, and intra-firm conflict (Amit & Shoemaker, 1993). 
Due to uncertainty, complexity, and conflict, firms will employ different strategic assets. 
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 permitted 
adequately capitalized and managed bank holding companies to acquire banks in any 
state. Successful banks utilized dispersion of banking activities to increase market size, 
economies of scale and reduce local market risk (Emmons, Gilbert, & Yeager, 2004). 
Since banking markets are imperfectly correlated, the dispersion of bank assets provides 
potential diversification benefits (Morgan & Samolyk, 2003). Ultimately, geographic 
diversification reduces overall bank risk (Liang & Rhoades, 1988) and consequently their 
risk of failure by expanding into multiple markets (Emmons, Gilbert, & Yeager, 2004). 
H5: Increased geographic diversification will be associated with lower failure rates 
When organizations encounter favorable experiences with risk, they become risk 
takers and begin to overestimate their chance of success with risk (March & Shapira, 
1992). In banking, competition has traditionally been a source of excessive risk taking 
(Matutes & Vives, 2000). Low interest rates and government incentives provided banks 
with a low risk/high return opportunity. Economic theory has found a positive 
relationship between risk and return, based on the assumption that the greater the risk, the 
higher the required return. However, Bowman (1982) found that higher risk also leads to 
higher failure rates. 
In the early 2000s, real estate prices were growing steadily allowing banks to 
gamble on consumers with a low credit score. In the event of default, the bank would be 
able to recoup losses by selling the house at the newer appreciated price. Unexpectedly, 
these mortgages had a much higher payback rate (Demyanyk & Hemert, 2008) 
encouraging banks becoming risk takers. Typically, firms performing above their 
aspiration level (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988) tend to assume less risk. However, many 
banks didn't perceive the risk until the economic crisis occurred. Managers accept risks 
because they do not expect that they will have to bear them (March & Shapira, 1987). 
They are insensitive to probabilities of possible outcomes. When the unexpected crisis 
occurred, risk-adverse banks were better situated to remain solvent. 
H6: Increased risk seeking behavior of banks will be associated with higher failure 
rates. 
Summary 
In summary, a model for the internal and external antecedents of firm failure is 
developed in Chapter II. The model tests, from an institutional theory and IO perspective, 
how the external environment impacts firm failure. The model also examines, from a 
resource-based view perspective, how internal operations of the firm impact firm failure. 
Both internal and external perspectives were used to develop seven research hypotheses. 
In Chapter III, the methodology will be introduced along with the description of 
the research design, data sample being used, and operationalization of the variables. In 
addition, the plan for data analysis will be elaborated on. 
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TABLE 7: TABLE OF HYPOTHESES 
H# Theory Predicted Relationship Variables 
HI Institutional 
Theory 
Larger bank size will be associated with 
lower failure rates. 
Nationwide deposits 
H2 Institutional 
Theory 
Organizational age will be negatively 
associated with failure rates. 
Chronological age 
H2b Institutional 
Theory 
Banks founded after the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act will have lower failure rates 
than banks founded prior to 1999. 
Founding Date: 
Before/After 1999 
H3 IO 
Economics 
Higher local industry concentration will 
increase failure rates in urban markets. 
Home market 
concentration ratio 
Founding Date: 
Before/After 1999 
H4 IO 
Economics 
Greater environmental volatility will be 
associated with higher failure rates in a 
region. 
Metropolitan area 
unemployment rate 
H5 Resource-
Based View 
Increased geographic diversification will 
be associated with lower failure rates 
Percentage of deposits 
outside home market 
H6 Resource-
Based View 
Increased risk seeking behavior of banks 
will be associated with higher failure 
rates. 
Total risk-based capital 
ratio 
54 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, the methodology used for empirical testing of the research model 
presented in Chapter II is described. Methodology used in prior failure literature is also 
examined and discussed. Subsequently, the research design is introduced with the 
detailed description of the sample, variables and their operationalization, as well as the 
statistical analyses to be used to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter II. 
Research Design 
A thorough examination of past failure research was conducted to develop the 
research design of this study. As previously mentioned, failure research has been 
presented in many different ways. Organizational decline (Whetten, 1980), organizational 
mortality (Carroll, 1983), organizational death (Freeman et al., 1983), bankruptcy (Sutton 
& Callahan, 1987), organizational extinction (Zuniga-Vicente and Vicente-Lorente, 
2006), and organizational exit (Ross & Staw, 1993; Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010), 
have been used to explain firm failure. All of these terms encompass firms that are no 
longer in existence. Appendix A16 lists all US bank failures from June 30, 2009 to June 
29, 2010. For this study, banks are defined as FDIC-Insured Institutions (Appendix B). 
16 Appendix A provides information on failed banks location, closing date, and failure outcome. Some 
failed banks were merged into another institution with FDIC assistance while others were closed 
completely due to financial difficulty. In either instance, the bank is considered failed per FDIC guidelines. 
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Sample 
This dissertation focuses on the 181 bank failures17 occurring between June 30, 
2009 and June 29, 2010 and the 27 bank failures from 2000 to 2007. The disparity in the 
number of bank failure in the two periods makes the comparative analysis interesting. 
Figure 4 shows how the problem has exploded over the past 3 years. 
FIGURE 4: NUMBER OF BANK FAILURES BY YEAR; 2000-2010 
Figure 5 represents bank failures, per month, during this timeframe. From 2000 
through 2007, no more than 11 bank failures occurred in any given year. In fact, 2005 
and 2006 saw no bank failures all together. By comparison, at least 11 banks failed in 9 
of the 12 months during 2010. 
17 Voluntary mergers and acquisitions that are unassisted do not count as bank failures (per FDIC 
guidelines). When a failure occurs, the FDIC will assist the bank in merging with another institution or shut 
it down after paying the depositors. Wheelock (2011; 431) noted that the recent financial crisis and 
recession leading to a wave a failures and mergers that contributed to the ongoing consolidation. He 
discusses the impact of unassisted mergers and their impact on concentration of local market which is 
different than failed banks (assisted). The focus of this study is on failed banks - those who were assisted 
by the FDIC. Voluntary mergers and acquisitions are not part of the study. Of the 181 bank failures studied, 
175 (96.7%) were merged with assistance into another institution. The remaining six failures (3.3%) were 
closed due to financial difficulty. 
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FIGURE 5: INCIDENCE OF BANK FAILURES BY MONTH: JULY, 2009- JUNE, 
2010 
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• FAILURES 
During the latter half of 2008, banks started failing at an alarming rate. The 
federal government created the TARP18 program, in an attempt to curb the financial 
crisis. TARP gave the US Treasury purchasing power of $700 billion to buy up mortgage 
backed securities (MBS) from institutions across the country to create liquidity and open 
up the money markets. Since TARP was used to prevent bank failure, firms that received 
any TARP funds were omitted from all analysis. 
Measures 
Table 8 provides the names of the variables used in the analysis, the definition of 
each variable, the years the variable data was collected, the type of variable it is, and the 
rationale behind using it. Categorical, continuous, and dichotomous variables are used. 
The research model contains two broad sets of analysis; internal and external antecedents. 
18 TARP (Troubled Assets Relief Program) funds were dispersed to infuse troubled institutions with 
liquidity. However, none of the 181 failed firms in sample received any TARP funding. Much of the 
allocated TARP funds went to larger diversified financial institutions, such as Bank of America and 
Citigroup, leaving smaller institutions to fend for themselves. 
I I I I • I I , I I 
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Measures for independent variables, control variables and the dependent variable are 
presented. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the unobserved hazard rate for bank failures (Kim & 
Miner, 2007). If the bank is no longer in existence and appears on the FDIC list of failed 
banks19 it is considered a failed bank for the analysis. However, if the bank remains in 
existence until the following period of analysis it is considered "not failed". Banks that 
were voluntarily merged or acquired were not part of this analysis. The list of failed 
banks was gathered from the FDIC database. All failed banks from June 30, 2009 to June 
29, 2010 were analyzed along with a matched pair survivor (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988; 
D'Aveni, 1989). 
Control Variable 
Return on assets (ROA) is a metric showing how effective a company's assets are 
at generating revenue. It is a measure of firm performance. In essence, it shows how 
many dollars a firm earns per dollar it has. ROA is very useful in comparing profitability 
intra industry as the competitors have similar structures. ROA is a common performance 
measure used in banking (and other financial institutions) as the majority of assets will 
have a carrying value that is close to the actual market value. The banks return on assets 
was collected from the FDIC database. Bank performance is used as a control variable. 
19 Both Kim & Miner (2007) and DeVaughn & Leary (2010) wrote strategic management papers 
concerning bank failures. In both cases, failure was operationalized the same way - using the FDIC 
distinction. Following Kim & Miner (2007), "Banks were considered to have failed if they were (1) 
liquidated or (2) merged with another bank with FDIC assistance Appendix A provides these distinctions 
for the sample. DeVaughn & Leary (2010) referenced the FDIC failed bank list. 
TABLE 8: TABLE OF VARIABLES 
Variable Definition Type of Variable Rationale 
Failure The bank is no longer in existence. Dependent; 
Dichotomous (1,0) 
FDIC definition is used to stay 
consistent. 
ROA Return on Assets Control; Continuous Variable for bank performance. 
Local Unemployment Unemployment rate of the home city of 
the bank. 
Independent; 
Continuous 
Variable for market volatility. 
Concentration Ratio Industry concentration of top 4 firms in 
local market. 
Independent; 
Continuous 
Variable for measuring industry 
consolidation. 
Age Number of years since founding Independent; 
Continuous 
Variable for organizational longevity. 
Risk Total risk-based capital ratio. Independent; 
Continuous 
Variable for risk seeking behavior. 
Size Total deposits for entire institution 
within the US. 
Independent; 
Continuous 
Variable for bank size. 
Geographic 
Diversification 
Percentage of deposits that are outside 
of home market. 
Independent; 
Continuous 
Variable for geographic 
diversification. 
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External Independent Variables 
Local unemployment indicates when the local economy is doing poorly. 
Businesses survival is dependent on its customers. When a large segment, or sub 
segment, of these customers become unemployed, the bank loses a large income base. 
When there is high unemployment, the average consumer is less likely to take out a new 
loan or pay back an existing loan. Since banks are reliant on interest from loans, less 
money is generated when consumers don't engage the business. Unemployment figures 
are collected during the failure as it has a rather immediate impact. Once an individual 
loses his or her job, loan repayment will immediately suffer. Unemployment figures (US 
Department of Labor) were collected for the metropolitan area that the bank was 
headquartered in and did most of their business. The unemployment figure used was the 
percentage of unemployed persons in the month that the bank failed. Data on 
unemployment was collected from monthly unemployment reports provided by The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
The concentration ratio illustrates the extent of the market control by the largest 
firms in the industry. The industry may be comprised of a few large firms or many small 
firms. The industry concentration can range from close to 0%, where the largest firms in 
the industry have no significant market share, to 100%. Zero percent concentration 
assumes perfect competition among competitors. High concentration (80-100%) would 
be considered an oligopoly or even a monopoly if only one firm is present. Most markets, 
however, fall somewhere in between. The active merging policy for bank failures tends to 
increase the level of concentration after a crisis (Perotti and Suarez, 2002). Due to the 
restrictive entry policy of banking, failed banks market share is far more likely to be 
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absorbed by a large existing competitor rather than a new firm. The concentration 
variable was collected using the most recent market data20 prior to failure. The 
concentration ratio is calculated by adding the market share for the four largest banks. 
This data was collected from FDIC market share reports. 
Internal Independent Variables 
Total risk based capital ratio (Risk) is defined at the bank's total capital divided by its 
risk-based assets. This will show how well the bank manages risk. If the bank holds low 
risk assets, such as government bonds, it will have a much higher risk based capital ratio 
than if it held primarily personal loans. Since government bonds are considered virtually 
riskless, they often have a risk rating of zero. In contrast, a personal loan carries a risk 
weight of 100 since there is often no collateral. Banks with high risk-weighted assets are 
required to have more capital on hand. Risk data was collected from the FDIC database. 
Total risk-based capital ratio: Total Capital 
Risk-based assets 
Organizational age (chronological age) and size (national deposits) are expected 
to impact failure rates in that organizational death rates decrease with age and size 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984). There are few relationships in social science as well 
established as the negative relationship between age and mortality risk (Thomhill and 
Amit, 2003). Increase organizational age allows firms to develop stronger relationships 
with other organizations, thus providing survival advantages. 
20 Market data is derived from the market share report provided by the FDIC. It provides detailed 
information on all competitors located in a particular city or metropolitan area. This data is collected on 
June 30th of each year. 
The organizational age of a bank was tabulated using the FDIC database. 
Chronological age was calculated by using the firm founding date. The age used for the 
analysis was the age of the firm on June 30th of that year. The organizational size is 
based on the total deposits the bank has nationwide. This data was collected from the 
FDIC database. 
Geographic diversification opportunities were made available to banks after the 
passage of GLBA and IBBEA. As a result, banks were no longer location bound as in the 
past. IBBEA permitted banks to operate across state lines. To capture the level of 
geographic diversification, the number of deposits outside of the market is divided by the 
total number of deposits. A bank that is well diversified geographically will have a lower 
percentage of total deposits residing in the home market. Data was collected using the 
FDIC database. 
Matching process 
A central part of the research design was to identify a matched survivor for each 
failed back as Hambrick & D'Aveni (1988) had done. The initial step was to collect 
information on all 181 banks that failed between June 30th, 2009 and June 29th, 2010 and 
the 27 bank failure between 2000 and 2007. Since local banking markets are often limited 
in the number of similar banks, the matching sample was expanded to the state level. 
Following D'Aveni (1989) firms were matched based on size and environment. As such, 
matched survivors were based on home state and total deposits. The same-state was used 
to analyze banks that had a similar environment. It would be problematic to analyze a 
bank headquartered in New York that operates in Los Angeles because they face different 
environmental conditions. The size parameter ensures that functionally different banks 
aren't matched. Comparing a large-national bank to a small community bank would 
create similar problems as their operations are uniformly different. 
Data Analysis 
Survival analysis is used to estimate the unobserved hazard rate of bank failure 
(Kim & Miner, 2007). This method uses all information provided by right-centered cases, 
and avoids biases that logistic regression could display (Allison, 1984). Parametric 
estimates of a hazard rate require assumptions about the effect of time on the occurrence 
of the events of interest (Kim & Miner, 2007) which is bank failure in this case. The 
hazard model controls for each bank's period at risk. It is important to control for the fact 
that some banks fail immediately while other fail over time. Static models fail to control 
for each firm's period at risk. Unlike static models, hazard models can incorporate 
macroeconomic variables that are the same for all firms at a given point in time 
(Shumway, 2001). Time, in this study, is length of survival during the period of 
excessive bank failures. The clock was started on June 30th, 2007 which is two calendar 
years before the sample period. This date was selected because (a) June 30th is the date 
when FDIC institutions report their financial data (b) 2007 was the last year with less 
than 10 bank failures; and (c) Failures began increasing towards the end of 2008, making 
analyzing the entire year problematic. A hazard model (Cox regression) is created using 
SPSS, a statistical program, to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter III. 
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Summary 
In Chapter III, the research design, data sample, and operationalization of 
variables were introduced. Dependent, independent, and control variables were described 
in detail, and given proper identification. The procedure for testing the hypothesis from 
Chapter II is also presented. The following chapter will include the results from the 
analysis conducted in Chapter III. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
In this chapter, results of the statistical analyses are presented. Descriptive 
statistics, correlations, and hazard model analyses are introduced in accordance with the 
hypotheses. Interpretation of the results follows analysis. Lastly, a review of hypotheses 
is presented at the end of the chapter to summarize the findings. 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented for all bank failures and 
matched survivors in Table 9. Though the total number of failed banks in the analysis 
was 181 (Appendix A), the number of failed banks with complete data that existed more 
than 5 years21 was 125. The data examined for outliers and influence points using 
Cook's distance and standardized residuals. Following Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000), 
standardized residuals greater than 3.0 or less than -3.0 were omitted from the analysis. 
Similarly, cases with Cook's distance greater than 1.0 were also omitted making the total 
sample of cases 228. Correlations for all the variables are examined to ensure there is no 
multi-co-linearity present. Each dataset was tested for multicolinearity by running 
collinearity statistics in SPSS. Mulicollinearity problems exist with a variance inflation 
factor (VIF) above 5 (O'Brien, 2007). There are no problems with multicolinearity as all 
VIFs were low; all between 1 and 2 with a mean VTF score of 1.476. 
21 Banks that operated 5 years or less were omitted from all analysis. Newly chartered banks are typically 
protected by regulatory agencies for the first three to five years (DeVaughn & Kim, 2006) limiting their 
usefulness in analysis. The same criteria were applied to all datasets. 
TABLE 9: CORRELATION MATRIX 
ID Variables Mean s.d 1 
1 Size22 28,747 263,843 1.000 
2 Age 47.39 47.39 0.038 
3 Concentration 78.87 17.16 -0.146 
4 Unemployment 7.81 2.759 0.278 
5 Diversification 31.16 26.80 0.275 
6 Risk 11.43 6.25 0.049 
7 Performance -3.93 5.20 0.077 
N = 228 banks; 664 bank years 
Bold are significant at p=.05 level 
22 Number is in thousands USD. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.000 
0.553 1.000 
-0.151 -0.120 1.000 
-0.037 -0.223 0.053 
0.231 0.109 -0.162 
0.032 -0.118 -0.045 
1.000 
0.047 1.000 
0.175 0.392 1.000 
a\ 
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Hazard Model 
To test the antecedents of bank failure during the financial crisis, a hazard model 
was used since. The hazard model has several advantages over static models including: 
(a) static models fail to control for each firm's period at risk, (b) hazard models 
incorporate time-varying covariates, or explanatory variables that change with time, and 
(c) hazard models produce more efficient out-of-sample forecasts by utilizing much more 
data (Shumway, 2001). A second hazard model was created to examine what caused 
recent23 bank failures prior to the crisis. Table 10 displays the results of the two hazard 
models. 
Fascinatingly, 5 of the 7 independent variables are significant either pre-crisis or 
post-crisis, but not both. This would conclude that bank failure is attributed to different 
causes during a crisis and non-crisis situation. Prior to the crisis bank size (p<.05) and 
market concentration (p<.10) were significant in support of hypotheses 1 and 3. 
Organizational size is a key determinant of legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996) and legitimacy 
is a primary determinant of survival (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Interestingly, organizational size had a lesser impact on survival rates during the crisis. It 
can be concluded that other, more impactful variables determined those failures. The 
same can be said about the concentration of the local market. Prior to the crisis, banks 
operating in highly concentrated markets were less likely to fail than those operating in 
dispersed markets. Typically, highly concentrated markets face a diminished threat of 
new entrants and are in better position to compete (Porter, 1980). Once the financial 
23 The second data set consisted of bank failures between 2000 and 2007. This time period was significant 
as it followed the GLBA of 1999. 
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TABLE 10: HAZARD MODEL ESTIMATES24; 
A. BANK FAILURES DURING THE CRISIS 
Variable - Coefficient S.E. 
Size 0.000 0.297 
Age -0.002 0.320 
Concentration 0.014 0.010 
Unemployment 0.139** 0.052 
Diversification 0.001 0.006 
Risk -0.223*** 0.039 
#Performance -0.086*** 0.028 
N= 228 banks; 664 bank years 
Log-likelihood = 399.90 
Chi-square = 95.20*** 
d f =  7  
B. BANK FAILURES PRIOR TO THE CRISIS 
Variable Coefficient S.E. 
Size 0.000** 0.000 
Age -0.002 0.377 
Concentration -0.032* 0.018 
Unemployment -0.238 0.203 
Diversification 0.428 1.210 
Risk -0.061 0.047 
#Performance 0.024 0.071 
N= 44 banks; 154 bank years 
Log-likelihood = 101.56 
Chi-square = 9.83* 
d f =  6  
*p<-10; **p<.05; ***p<.001 
# control variable 
24 Model A displays the results of the Hazard Model performed on the failures and matched pair from June 
30th, 2009 and June 29th, 2010. These failures occurred during the banking crisis. Model B displays the 
results of the Hazard Model performed on the bank failures and matched pair that occurred between 
January 1, 2000 and December 31 st2007. These failures occurred before the banking crisis began. 
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crisis began, other external forces increased failure rates, thus negating the positive 
benefits of high industry concentration. 
When the financial crisis began in 2008, the determinants of survival shifted. 
During the crisis, unemployment (p<.05) and risk-seeking behavior (p<.001) were 
associated with bank failure in support of hypotheses 4 and 6. Given that unemployment 
numbers were low prior to 2008, it is expected that a small variance between cities 
wouldn't cause a significant increase in bank failure. Unemployment numbers rose to 
their highest rates since the Great Depression. Those cities that were hit hardest were 
much more likely to see bank failures. Bank risk became a much more severe problem 
during the bank crisis. Banks were able to engage in riskier activity without consequence 
prior to the banking market decline. During that timeframe, higher risk would often lead 
to higher rewards (returns). During the crisis, however, higher risk led to higher failure 
rates. 
Additionally, there were two age-related discoveries. First, organizational age 
(H2) didn't significantly impact failure rates. Traditionally, nothing legitimates more than 
longevity (Deephouse, 1996).However, when the regulatory and technology changes 
occurred, older institutions faced a completely new financial services industry. 
Established banks had to begin new routines and procedures thus eliminating prior 
longevity advantages. Alternatively, banks that were founded after 1999 had lower failure 
rates25 (p<.085) in support of hypothesis 2b. As these institutions were born into the new 
25 H2b examined if banks founded after deregulation (1999) had lower failure rates than banks founded 
prior to it. Since an alternative perspective was used to contradict H2, this analysis was done separately. A 
dummy variable was created where 0=founded in 1999 or before; l=founded after 2000. The coefficient 
was 0.484 and the standard error was 0.283. It was significant at the p<.10 level. This data is not listed in 
Table 10. 
financial services industry, they were able to adapt to the rapidly changing environment. 
Table 11 displays the overall results of the hypotheses. 
To test for causality, variables were lagged 1 year and 2 years respectively to capture 
banks at the onset of the crisis and one year prior to it. Risk-seeking behavior was found 
to be the only significant variable (p<.05) that influenced the failure rate. This supports 
the conclusion that risk-seeking behavior becomes more harmful when there is a crisis. 
The risk-seeking behavior didn't have strong negative consequences until the financial 
crisis occurred. 
TAB] LE 11: SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
H# Theory Predicted Relationship Result 
HI Institutional 
Theory 
Larger bank size will be associated with 
lower failure rates. 
Supported; failures 
prior to the bank crisis 
H2 Institutional 
Theory 
Organizational age will be negatively 
associated with failure rates. 
Not Supported 
H2b Institutional 
Theory 
Banks founded after the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act will have lower failure rates 
than banks founded prior to 1999. 
Supported 
H3 IO 
Economics 
Higher local industry concentration will 
increase failure rates in urban markets. 
Supported; failures 
prior to the bank crisis 
H4 IO 
Economics 
Greater environmental volatility will be 
associated with higher failure rates in a 
region. 
Supported; failures 
during the bank crisis 
H5 IO 
Economics 
Increased geographic diversification will 
be associated with lower failure rates. 
Not supported 
H6 Resource-
Based View 
Increased risk seeking behavior of banks 
will be associated with higher failure 
rates. 
Supported; failures 
during the bank crisis 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the dissertation objectives are reviewed and the results of the 
empirical analyses from Chapter IV are discussed. Theoretical contributions are 
highlighted along with study limitations and opportunities for future research. 
Dissertation Objectives 
The core of this dissertation encompassed the question, what caused such a high 
rate of bank failure. Past bank failures have been examined and their antecedents 
explained. Temin (1976) listed falling agricultural prices, resulting from the great 
depression, as the trigger to the widespread bank failure of the 1930s. Geographic areas 
where local farms were failing in large numbers would be the same areas where the 
failing banks would be. 
Market forces and sectoral recessions that contributed to the bank failures of the 
1930s also contributed to the widespread bank failures of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
What differentiated the latter failure was the level of excessive risk taking (Hanc, 1997). 
Since the institutions were insured against losses, there was no incentive for them to 
monitor bank activities or demand risk premia on deposit interest rates (Wheelock & 
Kumbhaker, 1994). 
This current financial crisis has largely been attributed to Wall Street (Lewis, 
2010). Non-depository financial institutions created products based on risky mortgages 
and found ways to package them as seemingly secure investments. The ratings agencies 
(Moody's and S&P) gave risky assets gold-plated ratings, opening the door to a huge 
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market of CDO buyers (Lewis, 2010). Once the NDFIs had someone to sell the risky 
mortgages to, lenders were no longer concerned about repayment. Profit driven, facing 
minimized risk, lenders enticed Americans to take out mortgages they couldn't afford. 
American consumers gladly accepted these mortgages. 
Nevertheless, the financial crisis is only one aspect of the bank failures. This 
dissertation examined failure from an institutional theory, industrial organization 
economics, and resource-based view perspective. The objective of this dissertation was to 
illuminate how external factors, institutional factors, and organizational factors contribute 
to bank failure. This was accomplished using strategic management perspectives rather 
than relying on traditional finance literature on bank failure (see Beaver, 1966; Meyer 
andPifer, 1970; Sinkey, 1975). 
This study tested competing perspectives in the context of organizational failure. 
Using institutional theory and industrial organizational economics, deterministic 
perspectives are discussed as causes of bank failure. Contrarily, using the resource-based 
view perspective, the voluntaristic point of view is discussed. 
Discussion 
Hypothesis 1 tested if bank size attributed to their survivability. As expected, 
larger banks were more likely to survive than smaller banks. Liability of smallness 
(Aldrich & Auster, 1986) suggests that small banks do not perform as well as large banks 
and have higher failure rates because they incur problems raising capital, attracting and 
retaining highly skilled workers, and having higher administrative costs. 
The average size of banking institutions has growth nearly 250% larger in the 
past 10 years. Regulatory changes have produced large conglomerate banks that have 
become a one stop shop for financial services. Larger organizations are assumed to have 
more resources, better managerial skills and closer interorganizational relationships that 
presumably enhance the organizations capacity to withstand significant environmental 
changes (Freeman et al., 1983). Large size almost always lowers failure rates (Ranger-
Moore, 1997). However, this was not the case during the financial crisis. The hazard 
model found that organizational size didn't significantly influence failure rates during the 
financial crisis. Part of that non-finding can be attributed to TARP. The largest failing 
banks received assistance, and therefore could not fail. By analyzing failure without the 
largest banks, or other outliers, some of the value in bank size was inevitably lost. 
Hypothesis 2 tested the relationship between bank age and failure rates. Though 
organizational age often leads to higher survival rates, it did not in this study - for either 
timeframe. Selection processes typically favor older, more reliable organizations 
resulting in a decline in failure rates with age (Stinchcombe, 1965). Deregulation created 
opportunities for incumbent firms to introduce new products and enter new geographic 
markets. When a firm engages in a new activity26 for the first time, it needs to establish 
internal and external norms, new roles for organization members, standard operating 
procedures, and new patterns for interacting (Shane & Foo, 1999). As Shane and Foo 
(1999) indicate, firms that engage in new activities are more likely to fail as their 
members must learn new roles and establish routines and procedures. Older banks that 
had achieved legitimacy pre-deregulation had subsequently lost it as the industry 
26 Regulatory changes and technology improvements altered the competitive landscape of banking. The 
elimination of barriers between insurance, banking, and securities industries has created a completely new 
financial services industry (Yildirim, Kwag, & Collins, 2006). 
structure changed and consumers required more services. The constant evolution of the 
banking industry after the regulatory changes diminished longevity advantages that older 
banks had enjoyed. 
Hypothesis 2b tested whether banks born after deregulation enjoyed survival 
advantages. The results show that younger banks, founded between 2000 and 2005 were 
more likely to survive during the financial crisis. Older banks were at a disadvantage 
because firms that engage in new activities are more likely to fail as their members must 
learn new roles and establish routines and procedures (Shane & Foo, 1999). Newer 
institutions didn't have to contend with old routines, and thus enjoyed survival 
advantages. 
Hypothesis 3 tested the impact local industry concentration had on bank survival. 
These results showed that concentration was not significant during the financial crisis, 
but was significant prior to it. Higher industry concentration generally leads to greater 
profits (Scherer & Ross, 1990) which should lead to increased survival. However, others 
argue that a highly concentrated banking structure increases banking fragility (Boyd & 
DeNicolo, 2005). The results show agreement to both assertions. First, banking markets 
with higher concentration had fewer failures prior to the financial crisis. Given the 
banking industry's active merging policy and restrictive entry policy (Suarez & Perotti, 
2002) high concentration puts banks in better position to compete. Those operating in 
highly concentrated markets, therefore, will be less likely to fail. This relationship 
changed, however, once the financial crisis began. As Boyd & DeNicolo (2005) point 
out, high industry concentration also increases bank fragility. When the banking industry 
is healthy, other deterministic environmental factors are not pushing towards failure. 
When the banking industry is in crisis, however, external factors diminish concentration 
advantages. 
Hypothesis 4 tested the impact that local market volatility had on failure rates. As 
expected, the economic downturn increased failure rates in local economies that were 
severely impacted. When the local economy is suffering, all businesses in that economy 
suffer - including banks - thus increasing failure rates. The reason that local market 
volatility was not significant prior the economic crisis was because local economies were 
relatively stable across the United States. The variation of economic distress was minimal 
between 2000 and 2007. By the time the financial crisis was underway, there was a much 
larger disparity between stable and unstable markets. When local economies began to fail 
during the financial crisis, bank failures ultimately followed. 
Hypothesis 5 tested geographic diversification's relationship to bank 
failure. Geographic diversification was not associated with bank failure rates. It has been 
discussed how bank outcomes are severely tied to their local economy. Still, small banks 
are often not well diversified (Neely & Wheelock, 1997). Even though geographic 
diversification reduces overall bank risk (Liang & Rhoades, 1988) and subsequently their 
risk of failure by expanding into multiple markets (Emmons, Gilbert, & Yeager, 2004), 
many small banks lack the capacity or desire to expand. This study primarily utilized 
small to medium sized banks and therefore didn't include large banks that achieved 
diversification advantages. It is possible that an entire population of banks, containing 
large and small banks alike, would have significant results showing survival advantages 
for geographically diversified banks. 
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Hypothesis 6 tested risk seeking behavior as a factor of bank failure. As expected, 
banks that engage in riskier practices were more likely to fail during the financial crisis. 
Michael Lewis (2010), in his book The Big Short, mentions that Wall Street greed was 
behind much of the crisis. Subprime mortgages were created in the search for greater 
profits. While housing prices were rising, customers of subprime mortgages could be 
charged a premium. Since the housing prices were continually rising, the risk of these 
mortgages was minimal. Once real estate prices began to plummet, these risks (along 
with others) backfired. Banks were stuck with tremendous liabilities. Risk adverse 
institutions, that didn't engage heavily in these practices, remained relatively unharmed. 
Limitations and future research 
' A limitation of this study was that all banks in the United States were not 
included. Due to considerations of time and availability, only the data on failed banks, 
along with a matched-pair, was collected. This significantly reduced collection time as 
data for a few hundred, rather than several thousand banks was used. This may not be 
representative of the entire population as there were certainly not an equal number of 
failed and non-failed banks. Only about 2% of all banks in the U.S. failed during the 
timeframe of the study. Future research could include the entire population of U.S. 
banks. 
The lack of managerial decision making data was another limitation of this study. 
No hypothesis tested risk at the time of the decision making. Furthermore, no primary 
data was used to determine the managerial competency of the bank leaders. Only post 
hoc analysis of their decisions was used. A future study could collect primary data from 
those key decision makers at the banks. 
Another limitation was the timeframe. This study captured the first few years of 
the bank crisis. As the paper is completed, the recession is still ongoing. At this point and 
time, no one is certain when it will end. Similar to other studies done, an analysis of the 
bank failure could be done after the situation has passed. Alston et al. (1994) conducted a 
study on the Great Depression bank failures 50 years after it had ended. After some time 
has passed, it would be interesting to take a look back. 
Conclusion 
This dissertation tested deterministic and voluntaristic determinants of bank 
failure following the financial crisis of 2008. It was found that both internal and external 
factors were associated with failure. It was also determined that different factors are 
associated with bank failure during a financial crisis compared to a non-crisis situation. 
During the financial crisis, risk seeking behavior by banks was associated with bank 
failures. In stable economic conditions, risk seeking behavior may lead to higher 
profitability. Banks are insured against loses which gives them more latitude to take risks. 
However, when the market takes a downturn, the risk seeking backfires and leads to 
higher failure rates. As a result, the government is taking steps to reduce risk-seeking 
behavior27. 
27 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 contained "The Volcker 
Rule" section which bans most proprietary trading by banks with federally insured deposits. Trades related 
to market-making were exempt, provided that they met at least seven standards, or principles. The Volcker 
Rule was implemented to limit risk-seeking behavior. 
Another finding that was expected was that environmental volatility is associated 
with failure rates during an economic crisis. The period before the crisis was stable, so 
there were few bank failures. When the local economies began to falter, the banks within 
that market began to fail. This was expected because economic distress increases failure 
rates in almost every industry, including banking. 
This financial crisis was unique because organizational longevity didn't decrease 
failure rates but having a founding date after 1999 did. It was determined that banks that 
were launched after the deregulation period had lower failure rates. ATM networks and 
banking websites leveled the playing field in the early 2000s. New banks that adopted the 
high tech model were better suited for the new competitive environment. 
The factors associated with failure prior to the financial crisis, but not during, are 
equally interesting. Bank size, which should be universal, was only significant prior to 
the crisis. As expected, banks with greater size were associated with survivability. What 
mitigates this relationship is the federal government. Larger banks are considered too big 
to fail as their failure would have far reaching ramifications in the general economy. 
They cannot be considered successes because they need assistance. They cannot be 
considered failures because they technically didn't fail - per the FDIC definition. They 
are subsequently removed from analysis - masking any size based advantages of bank 
operation. 
Industry concentration was also associated with lower failure rates prior to the 
financial crisis but not during it. Industry concentration is local, like the environmental 
volatility. However, the negative effects of poor economic conditions supersede any 
positive effects of having a highly concentrated industry. Any advantages that firm may 
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achieve by being part of a consolidated industry are quickly erased when that economy 
falters. By being a part of that failing economy, likelihood of failure will increase 
regardless of concentration. 
To conclude, risk-seeking behavior and the economic downturn were strongly tied 
to this recent bank failure crisis. More banks failure occurred between 2008 and 2010 
than any other period in US history except for the Great Depression and the Savings and 
Loan Crisis. Managers and policy makers should take note. Risk-seeking behavior can 
potentially earn greater profits during an economic expansion, but it will cause failure 
when the expansion ceases. 
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APPENDIX A: US BANK FAILURES; rUNE 30, 2( )09 TO JUNE 29, 2010 
# Bank Name City State 
Closing 
Date Outcome of Failed Bank 
1 Founders 
Bank 
Worth IL 2-Jul-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: The PrivateBank 
and Trust Company - (33306) 
2 First National 
Bank of 
Danville 
Danville IL 2-Jul-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: First Financial 
Bank, National Association - (4382) 
3 Elizabeth 
State Bank 
Elizabeth IL 2-Jul-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Galena State 
Bank & Trust Co. - (19660) 
4 Rock River 
Bank 
Oregon IL 2-Jul-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: The Harvard 
State Bank - (9079) 
5 First State 
Bank of 
Winchester 
Winchester IL 2-Jul-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: State Bank of 
Lincoln - (12396) 
6 John Warner 
Bank 
Clinton IL 2-Jul-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: State Bank of 
Lincoln - (12396) 
7 Millennium 
State Bank of 
Texas 
Dallas TX 2-Jul-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: State Bank of 
Texas - (27074) 
8 Bank of 
Wyoming 
Thermopolis WY 10-Jul-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Central Bank and 
Trust - (529) 
9 Temecula 
Valley Bank 
Temecula CA 17-Jul-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: First-Citizens 
Bank & Trust Company - (11063) 
10 Vineyard 
Bank 
Rancho 
Cucamonga 
CA 17-Jul-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: California Bank 
& Trust - (20852) 
11 First 
Piedmont 
Bank 
Winder GA 17-Jul-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: First American 
Bank and Trust Company - (16858) 
12 BankFirst Sioux Falls SD 17-Jul-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Alerus Financial, 
National Association - (3931) 
13 Security Bank 
of Jones 
County 
Gray GA 24-Jul-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: State Bank and 
Trust Company - (57870) 
14 Security Bank 
of Houston 
County 
Perry GA 24-Jul-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: State Bank and 
Trust Company - (57870) 
15 Security Bank 
of Bibb 
County 
Macon GA 24-Jul-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: State Bank and 
Trust Company - (57870) 
16 Security Bank 
of North 
Metro 
Woodstock GA 24-Jul-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: State Bank and 
Trust Company - (57870) 
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17 Security Bank 
of North Fulton 
Alpharetta GA 24-M-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: State Bank and 
Trust Company - (57870) 
18 Security Bank 
of Gwinnett 
County 
Suwanee GA 24-M-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: State Bank and 
Trust Company - (57870) 
19 Waterford 
Village Bank 
Williamsville NY 24-Jul-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Evans Bank, 
National Association - (6947) 
20 Integrity Bank Jupiter FL 31-M-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Stonegate Bank 
- (57934) 
21 Mutual Bank Harvey IL 31-M-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: United Central 
Bank - (25330) 
22 First 
Bank Americano 
Elizabeth NJ 31-M-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Crown Bank -
(34259) 
23 Peoples 
Community 
Bank 
West Chester OH 31-M-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: First Financial 
Bank, National Association - (6600) 
24 First State Bank 
of Altus 
Altus OK 31-M-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Herring Bank -
(5568) 
25 Community 
National Bank 
of Sarasota 
County 
Venice FL 7-Aug-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Stearns Bank 
National Association - (10988) 
26 First State Bank Sarasota FL 7-Aug-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Stearns Bank 
National Association - (10988) 
27 Community 
First Bank 
Prineville OR 7-Aug-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Home Federal 
Bank - (28258) 
28 Colonial Bank Montgomery AL 14-Aug-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Branch Banking 
and Trust Company - (9846) 
29 Community 
Bank of 
Arizona 
Phoenix AZ 14-Aug-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: MidFirst Bank -
(4063) 
30 Union Bank, 
National 
Association 
Gilbert AZ 14-Aug-09 Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: MidFirst Bank -
(4063) 
31 
Community 
Bank of Nevada Las Vegas NV 14-Aug-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Deposit 
Insurance National Bank of Las Vegas 
- (59002) 
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32 
Dwelling 
House 
Savings and 
Loan 
Association Pittsburgh PA 14-Aug-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: PNC Bank, 
National Association - (6384) 
33 
CapitalSouth 
Bank Birmingham AL 21-Aug-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Iberiabank -
(28100) 
34 
First Coweta 
Bank Newnan GA 21-Aug-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: United Bank -
(172) 
35 ebank Atlanta GA 21-Aug-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Stearns Bank 
National Association - (10988) 
36 
Guaranty 
Bank Austin TX 21-Aug-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Compass Bank -
(19048) 
37 Affinity Bank Ventura CA 28-Aug-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Pacific Western 
Bank - (24045) 
38 
Bradford 
Bank Baltimore MD 28-Aug-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Manufacturers 
and Traders Trust Company - (588) 
39 
Mainstreet 
Bank Forest Lake MN 28-Aug-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Central Bank -
(27234) 
40 
First State 
Bank Flagstaff AZ 4-Sep-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Sunwest Bank -
(20164) 
41 Vantus Bank Sioux City 1A 4-Sep-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Great Southern 
Bank - (29546) 
42 
Platinum 
Community 
Bank 
Rolling 
Meadows IL 4-Sep-09 
This institution was closed due to - • - • 
; Financial Difficulty - Depositor Payoff. 
Acquiring institution:; This action did 
not result in a new institution. 
43 InBank Oak Forest IL 4-Sep-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: MB Financial 
Bank, National Association - (3628) 
44 
First Bank of 
Kansas City Kansas City MO 4-Sep-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Great American 
Bank-(10908) 
45 
Corns Bank, 
N.A. Chicago IL 1l-Sep-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: MB Financial 
Bank, National Association - (3628) 
46 
Brickwell 
Community 
Bank Woodbury MN 1 l-Sep-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: CorTrust Bank 
National Association - (6063) 
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47 Venture Bank Lacey WA 1l-Sep-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: First-Citizens 
Bank & Trust Company - (11063) 
48 
Irwin Union 
Bank and 
Trust 
Company Columbus IN 18-Sep-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: First Financial 
Bank, National Association - (6600) 
49 
Irwin Union 
Bank, F.S.B. Louisville KY 18-Sep-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: First Financial 
Bank, National Association - (6600) 
50 
Georgian 
Bank Atlanta GA 25-Sep-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: First Citizens 
Bank and Trust Company, Inc. -
(15504) 
51 
Southern 
Colorado 
National 
Bank Pueblo CO 2-Oct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Legacy Bank -
(12699) 
52 Warren Bank Warren MI 2-Oct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: The Huntington 
National Bank - (6560) 
53 
Jennings 
State Bank Spring Grove MN 2-Oct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Central Bank -
(27234) 
54 
San Joaquin 
Bank Bakers field CA 16-0ct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Citizens Business 
Bank - (21716) 
55 
Flagship 
National 
Bank Bradenton FL 23-Oct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: First Federal 
Bank of Florida - (31313) 
56 
Hillcrest 
Bank Florida Naples FL 23-Oct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Stonegate Bank -
(57934) 
57 Partners Bank Naples FL 23-Oct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Stonegate Bank -
(57934) 
58 
American 
United Bank Lawrenceville GA 23-Oct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Ameris Bank -
(20504) 
59 
First DuPage 
Bank Westmont IL 23-Oct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: First Midwest 
Bank - (3709) 
60 
Riverview 
Community 
Bank Otsego MN 23-Oct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Central Bank -
(27234) 
61 
Bank of 
Elmwood Racine WI 23-Oct-Q9 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Tri City National 
Bank-(18922) 
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62 
Bank USA, 
N.A. Phoenix AZ 30-0ct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: U.S. Bank 
National Association - (6548) 
63 
Pacific 
National 
Bank San Francisco CA 30-0ct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: U.S. Bank 
National Association - (6548) 
64 
California 
National 
Bank Los Angeles CA 30-0ct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: U.S. Bank 
National Association - (6548) 
65 
San Diego 
National 
Bank San Diego CA 30-0ct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: U.S. Bank 
National Association - (6548) 
66 
Park National 
Bank Chicago IL 30-0ct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: U.S. Bank 
National Association - (6548) 
67 
Community 
Bank of 
Lemont Lemont IL 30-0ct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: U.S. Bank 
National Association - (6548) 
68 
North 
Houston 
Bank Houston TX 30-0ct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: U.S. Bank 
National Association - (6548) 
69 
Madisonville 
State Bank Madisonville TX 30-0ct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: U.S. Bank 
National Association - (6548) 
70 
Citizens 
National 
Bank Teague TX 30-0ct-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: U.S. Bank 
National Association - (6548) 
71 
United 
Commercial 
Bank San Francisco CA 6-Nov-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: East West Bank -
(31628) 
72 
United 
Security 
Bank Sparta GA 6-Nov-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Ameris Bank -
(20504) 
73 
Home 
Federal 
Savings Bank Detroit MI 6-Nov-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Liberty Bank and 
Trust Company - (20856) 
74 
Prosperan 
Bank Oakdale MN 6-Nov-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Alerus Financial, 
National Association - (3931) 
75 
Gateway 
Bank of St. 
Louis St. Louis MO 6-Nov-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Central Bank of 
Kansas City - (17009) 
76 
Pacific Coast 
National 
Bank San Clemente CA 13-Nov-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Sunwest Bank -
(20164) 
77 Orion Bank Naples FL 13-Nov-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Iberiabank -
(28100) 
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78 
Century Bank, 
F.S.B. Sarasota FL 13-Nov-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Iberiabank -
(28100) 
79 
Commerce 
Bank of 
Southwest 
Florida Fort Myers FL 20-Nov-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Central Bank -
(27234) 
80 
The Tattnall 
Bank Reidsville GA 4-Dec-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Heritage Bank of 
the South - (50028) 
81 
First Security 
National Bank Norcross GA 4-Dec-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: State Bank and 
Trust Company - (57870) 
82 
The Buckhead 
Community 
Bank Atlanta GA 4-Dec-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: State Bank and 
Trust Company - (57870) 
83 
Benchmark 
Bank Aurora IL 4-Dec-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: MB Financial 
Bank, National Association - (3628) 
84 
AmTrust 
Bank Cleveland OH 4-Dec-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: New York 
Community Bank - (16022) 
85 
Greater 
Atlantic Bank Reston VA 4-Dec-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: SONABANK -
(57968) 
86 
Valley Capital 
Bank, N.A. Mesa AZ 1 l-Dec-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Enterprise Bank 
& Trust - (27237) 
87 
Republic 
Federal Bank, 
N.A. Miami FL 11 -Dec-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: 1st United Bank -
(35408) 
88 SolutionsBank Overland Park KS 1 l-Dec-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Arvest Bank -
(8728) 
89 
New South 
Federal 
Savings Bank Irondale AL 18-Dec-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Beal Bank, SSB -
(32574) 
90 
First Federal 
Bank of 
California, 
F.S.B. Santa Monica CA 18-Dec-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: One West Bank, 
FSB - (58978) 
91 
Imperial 
Capital Bank La Jolla CA 18-Dec-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: City National 
Bank-(17281) 
92 
Peoples First 
Community 
Bank Panama City FL 18-Dec-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Hancock Bank -
(12441) 
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93 
RockBridge 
Commercial 
Bank Atlanta GA 18-Dec-09 
This institution was closed due to 
Financial Difficulty - Depositor Payoff. 
Acquiring institution: This action did 
not result in a new institution. 
94 
Independent 
Bankers' 
Bank Springfield IL 18-Dec-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Independent 
Bankers' Bank Bridge Bank, National 
Association - (59021) 
95 
Citizens State 
Bank New Baltimore MI 18-Dec-09 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Deposit 
Insurance National Bank of New 
Baltimore - (59022) 
96 Horizon Bank Bellingham WA 8-Jan-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Washington 
Federal - (28088) 
97 
Town 
Community 
Bank & Trust Antioch IL 15-Jan-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: First American 
Bank - (3657) 
98 
St. Stephen 
State Bank St. Stephen MN 15-Jan-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Sentry Bank -
(8546) 
99 
Barnes 
Banking 
Company Kaysville UT 15-Jan-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Deposit 
Insurance National Bank of Kaysville -
(59027) 
100 
Premier 
American 
Bank Miami FL 22-Jan-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Florida 
Community Bank, National Association 
-(58991) 
101 
Bank of 
Leeton Leeton MO 22-Jan-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Sunflower Bank, 
National Association - (4767) 
102 Charter Bank Santa Fe NM 22-Jan-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Charter Bank -
(59030) 
103 
Columbia 
River Bank The Dalles OR 22-Jan-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Columbia State 
Bank - (33826) 
104 
Evergreen 
Bank Seattle WA 22-Jan-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Umpqua Bank -
(17266) 
105 
First Regional 
Bank Los Angeles CA 29-Jan-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: First-Citizens 
Bank & Trust Company - (11063) 
106 
Florida 
Community 
Bank Immokalee FL 29-Jan-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Florida 
Community Bank, National Association 
- (58991) 
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107 
Community 
Bank and 
Trust Cornelia GA 29-Jan-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: SCBT National 
Association - (13425) 
108 
First National 
Bank of 
Georgia Carrollton GA 29-Jan-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Community & 
Southern Bank - (59010) 
109 
Marshall 
Bank, N.A. Hallock MN 29-Jan-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Community & 
Southern Bank - (59010) 
110 
American 
Marine Bank 
Bainbridge 
Island WA 29-Jan-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: United Valley 
Bank-(15478) 
111 
1 st American 
State Bank of 
Minnesota Hancock MN 5-Feb-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Community 
Development Bank, FSB - (10568) 
112 
La Jolla 
Bank, FSB La Jolla CA 19-Feb-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: OneWest Bank, 
FSB - (58978) 
113 
George 
Washington 
Savings Bank Orland Park 1L 19-Feb-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Firstmerit Bank, 
National Association - (13675) 
114 
The La Coste 
National 
Bank La Coste TX 19-Feb-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Community 
National Bank - (23431) 
115 
Marco 
Community 
Bank Marco Island FL 19-Feb-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Mutual of Omaha 
Bank - (32325) 
116 
Rainier 
Pacific Bank Tacoma WA 26-Feb-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Umpqua Bank -
(17266) 
117 
Carson River 
Community 
Bank Carson City NV 26-Feb-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Heritage Bank of 
Nevada - (34072) 
118 
Centennial 
Bank Ogden UT 5-Mar-10 
This institution was closed due to"-. V 
Financial Difficulty - Depositor Payoff. 
Acquiring institution:. This action did 
not result in a new institution. -
119 
Waterfield 
Bank German town MD 5-Mar-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Waterfield Bank, 
FA - (59036) 
120 
Bank of 
Illinois Normal IL 5-Mar-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Heartland Bank 
and Trust Company - (20369) 
121 
Sun American 
Bank Boca Raton FL 5-Mar-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: First-Citizens 
Bank & Trust Company - (11063) 
122 
LibertyPointe 
Bank New York NY 11-Mar-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Valley National 
Bank - (9396) 
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123 
Statewide 
Bank Covington LA 12-Mar-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Home Bank -
(28094) 
124 
Old Southern 
Bank Orlando FL 12-Mar-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Centennial Bank 
-(11241) 
125 
The Park 
Avenue Bank New York NY 12-Mar-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Valley National 
Bank - (9396) 
126 
State Bank of 
Aurora Aurora MN 19-Mar-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Northern State 
Bank-(15242) 
127 
First Lowndes 
Bank Fort Deposit AL 19-Mar-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: First Citizens 
Bank-(23152) 
128 
Bank of 
Hiawassee Hiawassee GA 19-Mar-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Citizens South 
Bank - (28833) 
129 
Appalachian 
Community 
Bank Ellijay GA 19-Mar-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Community & 
Southern Bank - (59010) 
130 
Advanta Bank 
Corp. Draper UT 19-Mar-10 
This institution was closed due to 
Financial Difficulty - Depositor Payoff. 
Acquiring institution: This action did 
not result in a new institution. 
131 
Century 
Security Bank Duluth GA 19-Mar-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Bank of Upson -
(17041) 
132 
American 
National 
Bank Parma OH 19-Mar-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: The National 
Bank and Trust Company - (6731) 
133 
Desert Hills 
Bank Phoenix AZ 26-Mar-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: New York 
Community Bank - (16022) 
134 
Unity 
National 
Bank Cartersville GA 26-Mar-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Bank of the 
Ozarks - (110) 
135 
Key West 
Bank Key West FL 26-Mar-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Centennial Bank 
-(11241) 
136 
Mcintosh 
Commercial 
Bank Carrollton GA 26-Mar-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: CharterBank -
(30720) 
137 
Beach First 
National 
Bank Myrtle Beach SC 9-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Bank of North 
Carolina - (33527) 
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138 City Bank Lynnwood WA 16-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Whidbey Island 
Bank-(18412) 
139 
Tamalpais 
Bank San Rafael CA 16-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Union Bank, 
National Association - (22826) 
140 
Innovative 
Bank Oakland CA 16-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: BBCN Bank -
(26610) 
141 Butler Bank Lowell MA 16-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: People's United 
Bank - (27334) 
142 
Riverside 
National 
Bank of 
Florida Fort Pierce FL 16-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: TD Bank, 
National Association - (18409) 
143 
AmericanFirst 
Bank Clermont FL 16-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: TD Bank, 
National Association - (18409) 
144 
First Federal 
Bank of North 
Florida Palatka FL 16-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: TD Bank, 
National Association - (18409) 
145 
Lakeside 
Community 
Bank Sterling Heights MI 16-Apr-10 
This institution was closed due to 
Financial Difficulty - Depositor Payoff. 
Acquiring institution: This action did 
not result in a new institution. 
146 
Wheatland 
Bank Naperville IL 23-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Wheaton Bank & 
Trust - (33803) 
147 
Peotone Bank 
and Trust 
Company Peotone IL 23-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: First Midwest 
Bank - (3709) 
148 
Lincoln Park 
Savings Bank Chicago IL 2 3-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Northbrook Bank 
and Trust Company - (57082) 
149 
New Century 
Bank Chicago IL 23-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: MB Financial 
Bank, National Association - (3628) 
150 
Citizens Bank 
and Trust 
Company of 
Chicago Chicago IL 23-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Republic Bank of 
Chicago - (19333) 
151 
Broadway 
Bank Chicago IL 23-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: MB Financial 
Bank, National Association - (3628) 
152 
Amcore 
Bank, NA Rockford IL 23-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: BMO Harris 
Bank National Association - (16571) 
153 Frontier Bank Everett WA 30-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Union Bank, 
National Association - (22826) 
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154 
BC National 
Banks Butler MO 30-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Community First 
Bank-(10595) 
155 
Champion 
Bank Creve Coeur MO 30-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: BankLiberty. -
(30817) 
156 CF Bancorp Port Huron MI 30-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Talmer Bank and 
Trust - (58132) 
157 
Westernbank 
Puerto Rico Mayaguez PR 30-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Banco Popular de 
Puerto Rico - (34968) 
158 
R-G Premier 
Bank of 
Puerto Rico Hato Rey PR 30-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Scotiabank de 
Puerto Rico - (22946) 
159 Eurobank San Juan PR 30-Apr-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Oriental Bank 
and Trust - (31469) 
160 
1st Pacific 
Bank of 
California San Diego CA 7-May-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: City National 
Bank-(17281) 
161 
Towne Bank 
of Arizona Mesa AZ 7-May-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Commerce Bank 
of Arizona - (57279) 
162 Access Bank Champlin MN 7-May-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: PrinsBank -
(10191) 
163 
The Bank of 
Bonifay Bonifay FL 7-May-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: First Federal 
Bank of Florida - (31313) 
164 
Midwest 
Bank and 
Trust 
Company Elmwood Park IL 14-May-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Firstmerit Bank, 
National Association - (13675) 
165 
Southwest 
Community 
Bank Springfield MO 14-May-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Simmons First 
National Bank - (3890) 
166 
New Liberty 
Bank Plymouth MI 14-May-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Bank of Ann 
Arbor - (34120) 
167 
Satilla 
Community 
Bank Saint Mary's GA 14-May-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Ameris Bank -
(20504) 
168 
Pinehurst 
Bank Saint Paul MN 21-May-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Coulee Bank -
(18361) 
169 
Sun West 
Bank Las Vegas NV 28-May-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: City National 
Bank - (17281) 
170 
Granite 
Community 
Bank, NA Granite Bay CA 28-May-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Tri Counties 
Bank-(21943) 
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Closing 
Date Outcome of Failed Bank 
171 
Bank of 
Florida -
Tampa Tampa FL 28-May-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: EverBank -
(34775) 
172 
Bank of 
Florida -
Southwest Naples FL 28-May-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: EverBank -
(34775) 
173 
Bank of 
Florida -
Southeast Fort Lauderdale FL 28-May-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: EverBank -
(34775) 
174 
TierOne 
Bank Lincoln NE 4-Jun-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Great Western 
Bank-(15289) 
175 
Areola 
Homestead 
Savings Bank Areola IL 4-Jun-10 
This institution was closed due to 
Financial Difficulty - Depositor Payoff. 
Acquiring institution: This action did 
not result in a new institution. 
176 
First National 
Bank Rosedale MS 4-Jun-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: The Jefferson 
Bank - (11445) 
177 
Washington 
First 
International 
Bank Seattle WA ll-Jun-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: East West Bank -
(31628) 
178 
Nevada 
Security 
Bank Reno NV 18-Jun-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: Umpqua Bank -
(17266) 
179 
First National 
Bank Savannah GA 25-Jun-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: First American 
Bank - (2240) 
180 
Peninsula 
Bank Englewood FL 25-Jun-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: The Savannah 
Bank, National Association - (33120) 
181 
High Desert 
State Bank Albuquerque NM 25-Jun-10 
Merged with Financial Assistance into 
Acquiring institution: First American 
Bank - (2240) 
APPENDIX B: DEFINITIONS 
FDIC-Insured Institutions: The category of FDIC-insured commercial banks includes 
all commercial banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). It 
also includes all commercial banks insured by the FDIC that are regulated by and submit 
financial data to one of the three Federal commercial bank regulators (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency). The category of FDIC-insured savings 
institutions includes all institutions insured by the FDIC that operated under state or 
federal banking codes applicable to thrift institutions. 
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